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n a recent September morning I walked into the byu Law building before most of our students 
and employees had arrived for the day. The sun was still nestled behind Y Mountain, but its 
muted morning light floated into the Fritz B. Burns Memorial Lounge. My eyes were drawn to 
the colorful art installation displaying a series of stunning photographs by renowned photog-
rapher Steve McCurry and celebrating the Law School’s role in creating and promoting the Punta 
del Este Declaration on Human Dignity for Everyone Everywhere. The preamble to this declaration proclaims, 
“[E]qual human dignity of everyone everywhere is the foundational principle of human rights and reminds us 
that every person is of value and is worthy of respect.”1
 The notion that “every person is of value and is worthy of respect” resonates with us because we know that 
“the worth of souls is great in the sight of God” (D&C 18:10). Inspired by these ideas, we strive to create a law 
school that respects human difference. Indeed, we aspire to be a place where differences are welcomed. This aspiration of diversity and 
inclusion reflects an ancient understanding recognized by the Apostle Paul that difference is an inherent feature of community and that the 
gathering of diverse gifts elevates all members of the community. He wrote:
[J]ust as each of us has one body with many members, and these members do not all have the same function, so in Christ we, though many, form one 
body, and each member belongs to all the others. We have different gifts, according to the grace given to each of us. If your gift is . . . serving, then serve; 
if it is teaching, then teach; if it is to encourage, then give encouragement; if it is giving, then give generously; if it is to lead, do it diligently; if it is to 
show mercy, do it cheerfully. [Romans 12:4–8 (niv)]
 We desire to create a climate that encourages all members of the Law School community to “seek learning . . . by study and also by faith” 
(D&C 88:118). We recognize, however, that freedom of thought, belief, inquiry, and expression create the potential for conflict in a diverse 
community. In dealing with these conflicts, we echo the principles articulated by the Committee on Freedom of Expression at the University 
of Chicago, which proclaimed that “it is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they 
find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive.”2
 The Law School recently created another art installation that celebrates freedom of expression. In our library, we are displaying a series 
of illustrations by Utah artist Brooke Smart to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Utah women becoming the first American women to 
vote under an equal suffrage law and the 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment, which recognized the right to vote for all U.S. 
women. The courage of those who advocated for women’s suffrage is an example to all of us who believe that the world can be changed for 
the better through law.
 In the introduction to her book Mr. President, How Long Must We Wait? Alice Paul, Woodrow Wilson, and the Fight for the Right to Vote, Tina 
Cassidy reflected on similarities between the 1910s—the time just before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment—and our present 
day. This passage seems particularly relevant to the work of training leaders in law:
We fight the enemy abroad and battle each other at home. We hold sacred ideals but struggle to meet them ourselves. We forget that progress can 
be slow and sometimes indirect. But most of all, we fail to remember that it takes just one person—however imperfect—who is utterly committed to 
change, to make it happen.3
 As we embark on a new academic year at the Law School, I invite you to join us in creating a community in which every person is of value 
and is worthy of respect. As we work together in this community, I sincerely believe that we can change the world for the better.
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Dean, byu Law School
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n o t e s
1  The Punta del Este Declaration on Human Dignity for Everyone Everywhere: 
Seventy Years After the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Punta  
del Este, Uruguay, December 2018, dignityforeveryone.org/wp-content 
/uploads/sites/5/2019/02/Punta-del-Este-Declaration.pdf.
2  Geoffrey R. Stone, Marianne Bertrand, Angela Olinto, Mark Siegler, David A. 
Strauss, Kenneth W. Warren, and Amanda Woodward, Report of the Com-
mittee on Freedom of Expression, University of Chicago, January 2015, p. 2.
3  Tina Cassidy, Mr. President, How Long Must We Wait? Alice Paul, Woodrow Wil-
son, and the Fight for the Right to Vote (New York: 37 Ink, 2019), xii.
4 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
 
 B Y  E L D E R  J A M E S  R.  R A S B A N D
        General Authority Seventy, Former byu Academic Vice President, and Former byu Law School Dean 
I am humbled to have this opportunity to speak this 
evening. I feel keenly how short I fall compared to the 
extraordinary group of women and men who have spo-
ken at this fireside in the past, but I am nevertheless 
grateful to have this opportunity to share a few thoughts.
M Forty-five years ago, on the first day of classes at the 
J. Reuben Clark Law School, then university president 
Dallin H. Oaks gave an address in which he articulated 
six expectations for the Law School. His fifth expectation 
related to “the curriculum and manner of instruction,” 
which he said “should approach the law from a schol-
arly and objective point of view, with the largest latitude 
in the matters being considered.” Then he remarked:
p h o t o g r a p h s  b y  b r a d l e y  s l a d e
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  Yet despite the latitude that must be allowed for instruction in this law school, there are fun-
damental principles on which there is no latitude. We expect to have a vigorous examination 
of the legal principles governing the relationship between church and state under the Constitution, 
but no time for debate over the existence of God or man’s ultimate accountability to Him. There is 
ample latitude for examination of the responsibilities of a lawyer who is prosecuting or defending 
one of crime, but no room for debate over the wrongfulness of taking a life, stealing, or bearing 
false witness.1
 My effort in these remarks is to consider how we can distinguish interpretive questions 
on which we should give wide latitude and what President Oaks described as “fundamental 
principles on which there is no latitude.” As President Oaks also noted:
 [D]ifferent rules stand on different footings. There is no democracy among legal rules. Some are 
more important than others. Thus, some rules are based on eternal principles of right and wrong or 
on basic tenets of our Constitution. Others are rooted in the soil of men’s reasoning, soil that may 
be washed away by the torrent of human custom or the current of advancing thought, leaving the 
rule without support or justification. . . .
 In furtherance of their devotion to the rule of law the graduates of this law school [and, I will 
add parenthetically, all of the members of the J. Reuben Clark Law Society] should have minds 
sufficiently bright and consciences sufficiently sensitive to distinguish between rules grounded on 
morality and those grounded solely on precedent or tradition. Rules based on tradition may be 
assailed when their supporting reasons have lost touch with the soil of human need, but rules based 
on morality must be defended at all costs, since they are rooted in the eternal principles of right 
revealed by God our Father.2
 How, then, do we distinguish the rules that are essential—the rules that are fundamental 
and unalterable—from the rules “rooted in the soil of men’s reasoning” that can “be washed 
away by the torrent of human custom or . . . advancing thought”? Discerning this line is no 
small moral task. I don’t claim to discern this boundary with precision—and part of my point 
will be that we should be cautious in assuming we can—but I do claim that fundamental 
boundaries exist. More broadly, and equally fundamentally, I want to consider the principles 
that should guide our engagement with this line-drawing exercise.
T H E  E S S E N T I A L S  A N D  A D I A P H O R A
The effort to distinguish the essential from the nonessential is an age-old task. Stoic 
philosophers long ago divided human endeavor into three categories: good, evil, and 
adiaphora, which is a Greek term meaning “things indifferent.”3 During the Protestant 
Reformation, the
[r]eformers argued endlessly about what belonged in the category of adiaphora. Was it essential or 
indifferent if the priest wore a surplice? If the Communion table was level with the congregation or 
elevated? If communicants knelt or stood for Communion? If worshippers sang hymns? . . . And so 
forth. Great debates raged about the boundaries of “adiaphora” in a properly reformed church.4
 I must confess that references to the Greek language when I don’t know Greek or to the 
Stoics when I’m not a trained philosopher are a bit risky. As lawyers you likely share both my 
trepidation and my willingness to venture into areas where I have little formal training. It’s 
the life of a litigator.
 I was first introduced to the adiaphora terminology and idea years ago by John Tanner 
when we were serving together in the byu administration and considering an application 
of byu’s academic freedom statement. John pointed out how often the scriptures use 
the language “it mattereth not”5—and as I will discuss later, in many, many cases that is 
surely true.
This address 
was delivered 
at the J. Reuben 
Clark Law 
Society Annual 
Fireside on 
January 18, 
2019, while 
Elder Rasband 
was serving as 
byu academic 
vice president.
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 Although the precise debates that animated the reformers during the Protestant Refor-
mation no longer generate such energy, there is still plenty of energy—some appropriate and 
some inappropriate—for engaging in the boundary-drawing exercise of distinguishing the 
essential from adiaphora, or things indifferent. In my judgment, grasping the nature of this 
challenge is a task for which lawyers, by their training, are particularly well equipped.
 As a framework for considering the line between the essential and adiaphora, let’s return 
to President Oaks’s address on the first day of classes, when he said that “[w]e expect to have 
a vigorous examination of the legal principles governing the relationship between church and 
state under the Constitution, but no time for debate over the existence of God.” Doctrinally, 
God’s existence is not a matter for indifference. One cannot simultaneously claim both belief 
in the restored gospel and indifference about God’s existence. Note, however, that belief in 
the existence of God is adiaphora if the test is national citizenship rather than membership 
in the restored Church of Jesus Christ. This distinction is conceptually important when we 
operate in both worlds but presents a challenging tension to which I will return.
 What else can we confidently say is essential and not part of adiaphora for a believer? 
Immediately, we might add belief in the doctrine of the Savior’s atoning sacrifice and the 
two great commandments set forth in the Savior’s response to the lawyer’s question:
 Master, which is the great commandment in the law?
 Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, 
and with all thy mind.
 This is the first and great commandment.
 And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
 On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.6
 To take one more illustrative step, we could add the Ten Commandments to the essential 
list. We could continue this exercise all evening, identifying other doctrines and command-
ments and adding them to the essential core. As we add items to the core, however, at some 
point—and it would not be the same point for everyone in this room—we would hit issues on 
which we would disagree whether the teaching or practice was essential or adiaphora.7
 To take a common example, consider Sabbath observance. We might all concur about 
the essential nature of the command in Exodus:
 Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
 Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work:
 But the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work.8
But would we all agree on a list of permitted or prohibited Sabbath activities? How do we 
interpret the command to keep the Sabbath day “holy”? What does it mean that on the 
Sabbath day “thou shalt not do any work”? What about the ox in the mire? What about 
essential health and public services? And, to place this into the context of civil society, if 
we can discern the essentials of Sabbath observance, what, if any, part of those essentials is 
appropriate to demand of our fellow citizens? If we can settle upon the appropriate meaning 
and scope of Sabbath work, should our conclusion be imposed on fellow citizens in the form 
of blue laws?
 This same interpretive challenge of discerning the boundaries of the essential and 
adiaphora emerges in the application of doctrine after doctrine. Even in the two great 
commandments, we are faced with the interpretive question of exactly how love of God 
and love of our neighbor should manifest themselves. Ask any parent or close friend about 
what love demands, and they will surely tell you of the struggle for discernment.
 I hope it is clear that distinguishing the essential from adiaphora is not merely a theo-
retical exercise but instead the stuff of our everyday lives. If we struggle with a particular 
doctrine of the gospel, can we relegate that doctrine to adiaphora? How much room for 
disagreement is there? Is separating adiaphora from the essential just a matter of personal 
“ R U L E S  B A S E D  O N  
T R A D I T I O N  M A Y  B E  
A S S A I L E D  W H E N  
T H E I R  S U P P O R T I N G  
R E A S O N S  H A V E  
L O S T  T O U C H  W I T H  
T H E  S O I L  O F  
H U M A N  N E E D ,  B U T  
R U L E S  B A S E D  O N  
M O R A L I T Y  M U S T  
B E  D E F E N D E D  A T  
A L L  C O S T S . ”
— D A L L I N  H .  O A K S
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 preference, or is there a real line to be discerned? I am committed to the principle that there 
are, in fact, real lines to be discerned—I’ve mentioned just a few of them already. But my 
project isn’t to draw all those lines; instead, I’d like to consider some principles by which we 
can approach this discernment challenge.
P R I N C I P L E S ,  A P P L I C AT I O N ,  A N D  F E N C E S
I discuss a familiar but important idea: distinguishing the essential from adiaphora is partly 
about distinguishing principle from application. Here again, the law of the Sabbath is an 
instructive example. And to be clear, my primary concern is not the Sabbath. Rather, my 
sense is that the familiarity of Sabbath boundary questions will help illustrate the conceptual 
framework that I hope we can then apply to challenging doctrinal, political, and social policy 
boundary questions that weigh on each of us.
 President Russell M. Nelson taught about Sabbath day observance in a conference talk 
a few years ago:
In my much younger years, I studied the work of others who had compiled lists of things to do and 
things not to do on the Sabbath. It wasn’t until later that I learned from the scriptures that my 
conduct and my attitude on the Sabbath constituted a sign between me and my Heavenly Father. 
With that understanding, I no longer needed lists of dos and don’ts. When I had to make a decision 
whether or not an activity was appropriate for the Sabbath, I simply asked myself, “What sign 
do I want to give to God?” That question made my choices about the Sabbath day crystal clear.9
 Not only for Sabbath day observance but for any commandment, it is simply impossible to 
list all the potential applications. The value of focusing on principles is that, once internalized, 
the principle allows us to adapt to a wide range of questions and challenges. Principles have 
staying power, whereas applications can, in President Oaks’s words, lose “touch with the soil 
of human need.”10
 Although I fear it is disciplinary arrogance, I believe legal training equips us well to 
perceive the difference between principles and application. Starting in the first year of law 
school, there is a relentless focus on thinking about core theories and considering different 
hypotheticals that apply those theories. Take, for example, the study of tort law. The goal is 
not to turn everyone into expert personal injury lawyers. Rather the goal is to have students 
think about concepts such as unreasonable risk, causation, and the scope of an individual’s 
responsibility in society. Similarly, the purpose of a first-year property law course is not to 
make sure students can write up a mortgage or lease but to have them think about the nature 
of ownership. What makes something property? What limits can society place on our use 
of property? And in a first-year contracts course, the goal is not primarily to teach students 
how to write contracts but to have them think about why some agreements are binding but 
others might not be, why it matters when someone takes action in reliance on the promise 
of another, and so forth.
 In his address on the first day of classes at byu Law, President Oaks emphasized that the 
best legal training focuses on theory and principle:
The half-life of a legal concept, even in these changing times, is measured in centuries, not academic 
years. As legal historians can testify, many of the important problems and controversies of our 
day are just re-creations under different labels of problems encountered by successive generations 
for centuries into the past. A legal training that is predominantly theoretical is best able to equip 
students with the principles and skills they can apply throughout shifting circumstances of the next 
half-century.11
Thus, the goal of much of the study of law is not primarily to create specific expertise but to 
teach principles that will allow students to handle the multitude of different challenges that 
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will emerge in the practice of law or simply in the course of life. And, of course, one of those 
challenges is distinguishing principle from application and the essential from adiaphora.
 This is not to say that all application is adiaphora. Think about the Word of Wisdom. The 
crucial principle is that our body is a temple—and understanding that principle can answer so 
many questions about how we treat our body—but we still do have some applications (alcohol, 
tea, coffee) that are not matters of indifference, or adiaphora.
 When one listens to the leaders of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, it is 
not surprising that their talks focus primarily on principles rather than applications. Their 
focus is on the essential. This focus on teaching essential principles rather than applications 
has some other salient benefits. It is a powerful symbol of trust.12 It allows us not to be 
commanded in all things but to instead be anxiously engaged in good causes by our own 
free will and choice.13 Teaching principles also promotes the exercise of moral agency: we 
are free to act for ourselves in applying the essential principle to particular situations.
 If we are trying to discern the boundary between the essential and adiaphora, focusing 
on principles seems the wise course. We often teach this in the negative by pointing to the 
Sabbath practices of the scribes and the Pharisees at the time of Christ. Recall how the 
scribes and the Pharisees famously constructed fences around the Mosaic law. To ensure 
that the command not to work on the Sabbath was followed, for example, various detailed 
categories of work were defined, including how many steps one could take, how many letters 
could be written, and so on. The Savior famously condemned this approach by healing the 
sick and plucking and eating heads of grain on the Sabbath, and He taught that “[t]he sabbath 
was made for man, and not man for the sabbath.”14
 Still, we may be too quick in our criticism of the scribes and Pharisees for their fence 
building. It can be wisdom to build personal fences around commandments we wish to keep. 
Walking to the edge of danger is rarely wise. The Savior Himself proposed fences with respect 
to the commandment against murder, enjoining that “whosoever is angry with his brother 
without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment,” and with respect to adultery, forbidding 
looking “on a woman to lust after her.”15
 In our own efforts to live what is essential, we may construct protective fences. In doing 
so, however, we need to be mindful that our fence is not the equivalent of the underlying 
principle or law, and thus we should not insist that others build their barricades in precisely 
the same place. This was the real error of the scribes and the Pharisees.
 It can be so tempting to assume that the boundary between the essential and adiaphora 
is universal: that which we regard as essential is essential for everyone else, and that which 
we regard as a matter of indifference must be a matter of indifference for all. Here the 
admonitions to “judge not”16 and “to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God”17 seem 
particularly critical. If our neighbor’s application of a commandment is different than our 
application, it is not a cause for judgment. This is not to say that any behavioral choice is an 
acceptable application of the underlying principle. The key concept is one of accountability. 
We are surely accountable for our own demarcation between the essential and adiaphora. 
And that should be enough to occupy our full attention.
 Understanding that application choices are statements of personal accountability teaches 
a related point. Because in discerning the boundary between the essential and adiaphora, 
we often want to enlist others to our cause. If only the prophet or another leader would just 
give a talk affirming our preferred application of a doctrinal principle. Stated another way, 
we want our choices to be affirmed as being on the “do list” rather than on the “do not list.” 
This sort of capture the leader—or sometimes just capture the preferred talk—is a temptation 
for all of us (and I’ve certainly participated), but ultimately we are still accountable to the 
Lord for the boundary we draw and the application of the principle we pursue. Insisting that 
our demarcation of adiaphora be publicly affirmed is, in a sense, a request that the applica-
tion of others be condemned. How much better for all of us to charitably understand and 
humbly consider when others apply a principle differently and to instead focus on our own 
accountability.18
I N  O U R  O W N  E F F O R T S  
T O  L I V E  W H A T  I S  
E S S E N T I A L ,  W E  M A Y  
C O N S T R U C T  P R O T E C T I V E  
F E N C E S .  I N  D O I N G  S O ,  
H O W E V E R ,  W E  N E E D  
T O  B E  M I N D F U L  T H A T  
O U R  F E N C E  I S  N O T  T H E  
E Q U I V A L E N T  O F  T H E  
U N D E R LY I N G  P R I N C I P L E  
O R  L A W ,  A N D  T H U S  
W E  S H O U L D  N O T  I N S I S T  
T H A T  O T H E R S  B U I L D  
T H E I R  B A R R I C A D E S  I N  
P R E C I S E LY  T H E  S A M E  
P L A C E .  
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T H E  VA N I S H I N G  E S S E N T I A L
Another approach we sometimes employ 
to avoid hard questions about the bound-
ary between the essential and adiaphora is 
to reduce the size of the essential so that 
almost all doctrine, principle, and policy are 
a matter of indifference. Recall my earlier 
effort to set forth just a few core doctrines 
that could be categorized as essential—the 
existence of God; the Savior’s atoning sac-
rifice; the two great commandments to love 
God with “all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul, and with all thy mind” and to “love 
thy neighbour as thyself.”19 Visually, one 
can imagine a vast outer circle representing 
adiaphora and then, at the center, four inner, 
concentric circles identifying these essen-
tials. As I suggested earlier, additional essen-
tial doctrines could be added to expand the 
interior concentric circles—the covenants 
we make with our Heavenly Father are one 
example.
 What happens, though, when an essen-
tial principle or doctrine may not align with 
one of our political or policy preferences? 
One temptation is to ignore this possibil-
ity and uncritically assume that our pref-
erences align perfectly with the essential. 
Another risk is that we will simply reduce 
the area of what is essential until our prefer-
ence sits comfortably outside the essential 
circle and within the broader boundary of 
adiaphora. An example of this might be the 
idea that the only essential truth is God’s 
love and that everything else is adiaphora. 
This has some appeal because God’s love 
for us—and the two great commandments 
that we love Him and love our neighbor—is 
indeed an essential baseline principle from 
which so many important and faithful appli-
cations can be derived.
 The risk, however, is that if love is the 
one essential, the other commandments 
can be relegated as adiaphora. Yet the Savior 
was clear that on the two great command-
ments “hang all the law and the proph-
ets.”20 He also said, “If ye love me, keep 
my commandments.”21 Thus, the Savior 
invested the principle of love with essential 
subsidiary principles and applications. This 
makes sense because the commandments 
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themselves are a manifestation of God’s love in the form of information about how to live 
joyfully.22
 What is critical, I think, is to not relegate the commandments to adiaphora. If the 
commandments are matters of indifference, then the Savior’s atoning sacrifice is irrelevant; 
mercy would not need to satisfy the demands of justice.23 It would be no small irony if 
Christ’s teachings about love were understood to vitiate His greatest act of love—His sacrifice 
to atone for our sins—on the assumption that He unnecessarily paid a price that justice did 
not require.24
I N  A L L  T H I N G S ,  C H A R I T Y
Discerning the precise boundaries of the essential and adiaphora is a lifetime project. Indeed, 
I am quite confident we won’t discern its full boundaries during our lifetime, for as Paul said:
 For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall 
I know even as also I am known.
 And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.25
 If we can’t discern the boundary precisely, I hope I have been clear that there are indeed 
essential, eternal truths discernible to those who seek them. Indeed, the most precious truths 
are most fully known by the Spirit. But even if the essential is most perceptively discerned 
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by the Spirit, I hope also that I have hit upon 
a few useful principles to guide our effort 
to study out in our minds the boundary 
between the essential and adiaphora.
 Drawing boundaries is such an impor-
tant function of our exercise of agency, and 
the effort can be so challenging; even when 
we properly discern what is essential, we fail 
to consistently live in accordance with the 
truths we know. Paul’s admonition to charity 
is critical. I tried to capture this idea in the 
title of my remarks tonight—“In Essentials, 
Unity; in Nonessentials, Liberty; and in All 
Things, Charity.” This language is found in 
byu’s Academic Freedom Policy,26 which is 
the context in which John Tanner first intro-
duced me to adiaphora.
 The policy makes what I believe is a 
noble effort to give notice in concrete terms 
of the boundary between the essential and 
adiaphora, at least for the academic project 
of faculty at byu. As it must, the document 
describes the boundaries with reference 
to principles rather than precise applica-
tions, concluding that a limit on individual 
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faculty academic freedom “is reasonable when the faculty behavior or expression seriously 
and adversely affects the University mission or the Church.” The document provides three 
examples, including “expression with students or in public that contradicts or opposes, rather 
than analyzes or discusses, fundamental Church doctrine or policy.” No finding of a violation 
is appropriate “unless [a] faculty member can fairly be considered aware that the expression 
violates the standards.”27
 As one of the persons charged with applying this principle, I can tell you that it is a 
humbling and daunting role. Fortunately, the occasions when we need to engage in this 
boundary analysis are truly rare. But when we do, the Academic Freedom Policy counsels:
 The faculty, administration, and the Board should work together in a spirit of love, trust, and 
goodwill. The faculty rightly assumes its work is presumptively free from restraint, but at the same 
time it assumes an obligation of dealing with sensitive issues sensitively and with a civility that 
becomes believers. byu rightly expects lds faculty to be faithful to, and other faculty to be respect-
ful of, the Church and byu’s mission. Thus both the University’s governing bodies and the faculty 
obligate themselves to use their respective academic freedom responsibly, within the context of a 
commitment to the gospel. As Elder B. H. Roberts said, “In essentials let there be unity; in non-
essentials, liberty; and in all things, charity.”28
 This posture seems exactly right for byu, and it articulates a principle that applies well 
beyond academic confines. I join in the hope that in essentials we will find unity and in 
nonessentials, liberty. But because the essential and the nonessential adiaphora can be 
challenging to discern—particularly at the margins and with those whose values or faith 
differ from our own—I hope that in all instances we will exhibit charity. In the name of 
Jesus Christ, amen.
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  y dear brothers and sisters, I am honored to speak to 
you today and to share my witness of the Savior and the 
good news of the gospel. I want to acknowledge that we 
are gathered in this valley that is the traditional homeland 
of indigenous peoples called today the Utes, the Paiutes, 
and the Shoshone nations, among others. I honor their 
resilience, and I am thankful for their preservation as peoples.
M
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 I believe that the Lord has preserved 
many essential truths by preserving the 
indigenous peoples and their cultures. Just 
as Joseph of old stored up grain against 
the time of famine to save the house of 
Israel, and just as the record of Lehi and 
his children was preserved against a time 
of spiritual famine, indigenous peoples and 
cultures hold truths to teach us in this age of 
political, moral, and ecological turbulence.
 I am a member of the Seneca Nation 
of Indians from New York. I grew up in a 
small branch of The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints on the Cattaraugus 
Res ervation .  I  am gratefu l  for  my 
inheritance as a Seneca, as well as for the 
strength of my pioneer ancestors. I receive 
many blessings that come to me through 
those who chose the path of discipleship. I 
acknowledge with gratitude those who came 
before, who showed the way, who prepared 
the ground for my faith to flourish, and who 
opened the doors for the opportunities that 
have been mine.
 Similarly, I acknowledge that this cam-
pus is sacred ground. It has been set apart—
consecrated—for our learning “by study and 
also by faith.”1 In that spirit, I hope to share a 
message with you that might help you navi-
gate the difficult days ahead and the many tri-
als of your faith that will come as your lives 
unfold. We will each face the trials inherent 
to mortality—trials of physical frailty, men-
tal illness, heartbreak, loss, political turmoil, 
and rampant injustice—and spiritual trials 
that will surely test our commitment to the 
Savior and His kingdom.
 College is a time of tremendous growth, 
both intellectually and spiritually. We 
develop critical thinking skills and take in 
so much information. We wrestle before the 
Lord to develop and deepen our testimonies 
and flesh out our identities. In this age of 
abundant information and disinformation, 
how do we know where to turn as we refine 
our beliefs and mature our testimonies? 
And how do we respond as our faith passes 
through refining fires?
 My message to you today is that, 
whatever your trials—mortal or spiritual—
you can choose to trust in the Lord. While so 
much around you is inconstant and fleeting, 
He is faithful. He will never fail you. You 
may rely on His love as an unerring truth.
In the Midst of Fiery Trials
In difficult times, you may find yourself ask-
ing, as this hymn does:
Where can I turn for peace? 
Where is my solace
When other sources cease to make me whole? . . .
Where, when my aching grows, 
Where, when I languish,
Where, in my need to know, where can I run?
Where is the quiet hand to calm my anguish?
Who, who can understand? 
He, only One.2
 My life experiences have taught me 
the truth of the hymn’s answer. The Lord is 
there to understand and to quiet our anguish. 
At many points I have seen the Lord’s hand 
moving miraculously to order and bless the 
circumstances of my life. He has prepared a 
path, opened doors, raised up friends, and 
multiplied joys in my life. I have seen how 
these blessings have been tailored spe-
cifically for me and fitted to my particular 
needs. Many blessings were set in motion 
long before my needs arose. So too has the 
adversary tailored opposition and trials to fit 
my weakness.
 There have also been times when I have 
longed for the Lord’s intervention in specific 
ways, when I have petitioned and pleaded 
with the Lord for blessings that have not 
been realized. There have been questions 
that have gone unanswered and times when 
the heavens felt silent. In those moments 
the adversary has tried to whisper that no 
one has heard my prayers. I have prayed and 
fasted for many years that the promise of my 
patriarchal blessing and other priesthood 
blessings—that I would find a true com-
panion and be a mother—might be fulfilled. 
Those blessings have not been realized for 
me on my preferred timeline, despite my 
most fervent petitioning. But it has not been 
because no one heard them. That was a lie 
from the adversary. My Father in Heaven 
has heard and answered every prayer, even 
when the answers have been difficult for me.
 Of course I have had a rich, happy, and 
fulfilling life. The Lord has poured out 
abundant blessings—meted out with the 
“good measure” of the Lord, “pressed down” 
and “running over”3—far beyond my merits. 
But my life has not looked like the life I 
would have sought for myself.
 In coping with the Lord’s counsel to 
wait or to do without, I have had to learn 
to choose to trust the Lord. I have had 
to choose to let these experiences refine 
and deepen my faith rather than yield to 
the temptation to despair in the Lord and 
abandon my hope and faith.
 Everyone passes “through fiery trials.”4 I 
know that many of you, though you may be 
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young, are like the Savior, acquainted with 
grief. Many of you may be weighed down 
with your own sorrows, challenges, or dis-
appointments. Some of you may be wres-
tling through questions concerning your 
faith. I know that the Savior is intimately 
acquainted with your grief and sees your sor-
rows. He has promised one day to wipe away 
all tears. And He will. But, in the meantime, 
during those moments of fiery trial, how do 
we choose to trust in the Lord—especially 
when we may, for a time, feel alone?
 I hope that some of the lessons I am 
learning might be of some comfort to you 
now or in future times of need.
 Like the blessings I have received, 
the challenges I have faced have been 
individualized, tailor-made to cultivate 
my strengths and to fortify my weaknesses. 
In walking my path, I have been given the 
opportunity to choose to love and obey 
the Lord, even when I have felt sometimes 
forsaken. I am learning that my faith in the 
Lord is not conditioned on getting what I 
want when I want it. Instead, I have worked 
to develop trust and love for the Lord that is 
not transactional but relational. I love Him 
for who He is. I trust Him and His love for 
me. He is my Creator and Savior.
 I offer three principles that have helped 
me choose to trust the Lord in times of trial. 
I offer these principles humbly—knowing 
that you walk a path tailored for you—but 
also confidently, trusting in the constancy 
of the Lord.
pr i nc i p l e  num b e r  1  
The Seven Generations Principle
First, I offer one lesson from the Seneca 
tradition. It is an idea found in many indig-
enous cultures in some form. It is called the 
seven generations principle.5 The seven 
generations principle in the Seneca culture 
means that we are obliged to consider the 
consequences and outcomes of our choices 
on the next seven generations. It is a cultural 
value that entrenches the practice of taking 
the long view where possible and acting in 
the interest of the long term rather than the 
short term. The seven generations principle 
challenges us to pause and contemplate how 
our choices, when multiplied and amplified 
through future generations, might affect 
our relationships with the Creator, with one 
another, and with the earth.
 This principle means that we strive to 
keep an eye on the things of eternity, even—
perhaps especially—in the midst of blinding 
mortal pain. How do we maintain that long 
view and choose to trust the Lord when the 
pain of our physical or spiritual trial is so 
acute and present, when the suffering is sore 
and stubborn?
 When I say to keep an eye on the eter-
nal in the midst of mortal pain, I mean that 
we should seek to keep our spiritual gaze 
fixed on the great eternal sacrifice, the infi-
nite Atonement of Jesus Christ. The adver-
sary seeks to distract us by fixing our focus 
entirely on our temporal pain 
and by tempting us to dwell on 
perceived slights and injustices, 
obscuring the Lord’s love. This 
is one reason it is imperative that 
we partake of the sacrament each 
week, renewing our covenant to 
“always remember”6 the Savior.
 Just as He suffered, we will suffer as 
part of the mortal experience. In choosing 
to trust the Lord, we can consecrate our 
suffering to a greater understanding of His 
suffering and allow it to build in us a deeper 
capacity for compassion and mercy toward 
the suffering of others. Though He was per-
fect, He made Himself an offering of mercy 
to satisfy justice. Having drunk from that 
bitter cup, He knows how to succor and 
comfort us in our infirmities if we trust Him.
 As Alma taught his son Helaman, “I do 
know that whosoever shall put their trust in 
God shall be supported in their trials, and 
their troubles, and their afflictions, and 
shall be lifted up at the last day.”7 Putting 
our trust in God does not spare us from trials, 
troubles, or affliction. Instead, God has 
promised to support us while we are in those 
mortal difficulties. Elder Neal A. Maxwell 
taught of our trials, “Rather than simply 
passing through these things, they must 
pass through us and do so in ways which 
sanctify these experiences for our good.”8 By 
taking the long view, as the Seneca culture 
counsels, and choosing to trust the Lord and 
His eternal timeline, we can pass through 
our trials and let the trials pass through us 
as we deepen—not abandon—our faith and 
our kindness.
pr i nc i p l e  num b e r  2  
“Seek Not to Counsel the Lord”
In addition to the seven generations 
principle of taking the long view, might 
I suggest a second principle that seems 
especially relevant to the successful 
navigation of our trials. I take this principle 
from Jacob’s plea to the wavering Nephites. 
He urged, “Seek not to counsel the Lord, but 
to take counsel from his hand.”9
 If you are like me, you are full of great 
ideas, hopes, and dreams about how your 
lives ought to go: the timing of change and 
the fulfillment of blessings, jobs or other 
experiences we might enjoy, or 
opportunities that we think would 
be a good fit and would help us to 
be happy. Indeed, we are com-
manded to ask the Lord for the 
desires of our hearts. With faith—
and with fasting, when appropri-
ate—we should plead with and petition the 
Lord for the experiences we desire.
 That is a very different thing than seeking 
to counsel the Lord or resisting His counsel.
 Seeking to counsel the Lord means to 
me that we adjudge our wisdom and pref-
erences to be superior to the Lord’s. That 
reflects a fundamental lack of trust in His 
omniscience, in His omnipotence, and, 
more important, in His perfect love. We 
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 might suppose that if we could only per-
suade the Lord to do things our way, life 
would be much improved. We may feel frus-
trated by what we deem His resistance to our 
counsel on such matters.
 Although I am now a law professor, in 
my heart of hearts and by experience and 
inclination, I am a civil rights lawyer. I 
loved working as an attorney enforcing the 
federal civil rights laws at the United States 
Department of Justice. I feel passionately 
about the rule of law and the pursuit of 
justice. I believe in the equal dignity of all 
God’s children. I mourn with those who 
mourn about the deep injustice that falls 
so disproportionately on people of color, 
on religious minorities, on our LGBTQ+ 
brothers and sisters, on immigrants and 
refugees, and on others. I believe my love 
for the equal dignity of all God’s children 
is one of the spiritual gifts He has given me. 
But as much as I may love and seek after 
justice, I do not have anything to teach the 
Lord about justice. He does not need my 
counsel as an advocate about how to bless 
and provide for His children or about how 
to order His kingdom. He sees the end from 
the beginning, “and there is not anything 
save he knows it.”10
 One title for an attorney is “counselor.” 
It is a title I have held in various settings. In 
my roles as an attorney and as a law pro-
fessor, I offer counsel to others that draws 
upon my study and professional judgment. 
It is meant to guide and protect those I serve. 
With the credentials of my education and 
experiences comes trust. Some attorneys 
earn thousands of dollars an hour for their 
counsel. (Not me, by the way. Despite how 
expensive law school feels to law students, I 
would much rather be here with you.) But as 
attorneys, we come to think that our counsel 
has tremendous value to help resolve prob-
lems and address challenges. And it can. 
This is true for all professionals.
 You too, as educated individuals, are 
earning credentials and having experiences 
that are shaping and informing your judg-
ment. Those credentials will give weight and 
amplification to your views in society and 
will add value to resolving the many varied 
problems—personal and professional—that 
you will face. Those of us who have respon-
sibilities for your education are eager for you 
to develop sound critical thinking skills and 
judgment.
 Whatever your field of study, I have no 
doubt that you will contribute your learning 
and good judgment to the inevitable and 
daunting challenges of your families, your 
employers, your communities, and your 
congregations. But no matter how learned 
we may become in whatever field, and no 
matter the earthly value of our counsel, we 
will never have knowledge or judgment 
that will exceed the Lord’s. That is why we 
should not seek to counsel the Lord but 
should seek to take counsel from His hand.
 Jacob warned against seeking to counsel 
the Lord because of what he called the 
“cunning plan of the evil one”11 specifically 
targeting those of us who have opportunities 
for learning. Jacob lamented:
O the vainness, and the frailties, and the fool-
ishness of men! When they are learned they 
think they are wise, and they hearken not unto 
the counsel of God, for they set it aside, suppos-
ing they know of themselves, wherefore, their 
wisdom is foolishness and it profiteth them not. 
And they shall perish.
 But to be learned is good if they hearken 
unto the counsels of God.12
 We must not allow the great gift and 
blessing of our learning and education to 
divide us from His wisdom. Instead, we 
must let our learning deepen our trust in 
Him and multiply the gifts we have to offer 
to Him and His children. I have learned 
that He does not need to be persuaded to 
do good things or advised about “how to 
give good gifts unto [His] children.”13 While 
there are many settings in which He will 
draw upon our good judgment and learning 
to bless lives, we must remember that He 
does not need the best thinking of the wisest 
and brightest among us to augment His 
understanding. He already has all wisdom 
and all judgment.
 I  will  add here a warning about 
another great temptation that we must 
guard against as those with the blessings 
of advanced education. Nephite society, 
including the Church, was stratified and 
destroyed because “there became a great 
inequality in all the land.”14 What caused 
the inequality? In part it was because “the 
people began to be distinguished by ranks, 
according to their riches and their chances 
for learning.”15 The people who had money 
or who had “chances for learning” looked 
down on those who did not. Let us never 
misappropriate the blessing of our educa-
tion as a cause to vaunt our knowledge over 
those who have not had the same opportu-
nities we have had—and certainly not as a 
reason to vaunt our wisdom over the Lord’s. 
Rather, let us humbly consecrate our gifts 
to the Lord. Let us serve and love His chil-
dren, no matter their circumstances and 
even when we do not understand the Lord’s 
purposes.
 A long time ago, I was called as a mis-
sionary to the Texas Houston Mission. The 
call said that I should report to the MTC to 
prepare to teach the gospel in the English 
language. As my stake president set me apart 
as a missionary, I remember him saying 
these words: “The language the Lord would 
like you to learn is the language of the Spirit.”
 I knew that to learn the vocabulary and 
grammar of the language of the Spirit, I 
would need to study the scriptures, identify 
promptings, and understand the whisper-
ings of the Holy Ghost. I knew that it was 
+ + +
 IN CHOOSING TO  
TRUST THE LORD, WE CAN 
CONSECRATE OUR  
SUFFERING TO A GREATER 
UNDERSTANDING OF  
HIS SUFFERING AND ALLOW 
IT TO BUILD IN US A  
DEEPER CAPACITY FOR  
COMPASSION AND  
MERCY TOWARD THE  
SUFFERING OF OTHERS.
+ + +
19c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
a language I had been learning my whole 
life as my parents taught me to keep the 
commandments and to love the Lord. I had 
mentors and teachers who had modeled 
fluency in the language of the Spirit. “To 
take counsel from [the Lord’s] hand,”16 as 
Jacob instructed, we must develop our own 
fluency in the language of the Spirit. To try 
to learn that language, I undertook a deep 
study of the Book of Mormon.
 Once I had arrived at the MTC, I enjoyed 
learning the principles of missionary work, 
but I kept wondering how I might say certain 
phrases in Spanish. When that happened, I 
told myself to keep focused on the tasks 
at hand. But my mind kept wandering to 
the few Spanish phrases I knew, and I kept 
wondering about Spanish grammar and 
vocabulary.
 I eventually recognized that these 
unbidden thoughts were the whisperings 
of the Spirit helping to prepare me to go to 
Houston, Texas, where there would be many 
people I would meet who would speak Span-
ish. So I went to the MTC bookstore and 
bought a copy of El Libro de Mormón and 
put it with my things, pleased that I had felt 
and recognized a prompting and sure that 
I would have the opportunity to share that 
book with someone as a missionary.
 When I arrived in Houston a few weeks 
later, my mission president, Clark T. Thor-
stenson, pulled me aside at the airport. He 
said, “Sister Steele, the Lord has made it 
clear to me that He would like you to learn 
Spanish. I am assigning you to the Spanish-
speaking program.”
 I felt like the Lord had been trying to 
whisper it to me all along and was smiling, 
now that I was in on the plan too. That 
evening I wondered how I would ever learn 
Spanish, and I wished that I could go back to 
the MTC. Then I remembered my Libro de 
Mormón. I took it out and began to read. My 
study of the Book of Mormon in preparing 
for my mission helped me to follow along: 
“Yo, Nefi, nací de buenos padres.”17 Buenos 
padres? “Goodly parents”!18
 At first I had no other books to use to 
study the Spanish language except for the 
Book of Mormon. But I remembered the 
inspired counsel of my stake president: the 
language the Lord wanted me to learn was 
the language of the Spirit. I enlisted the 
Spirit—who, it turns out, speaks perfect Span-
ish—to magnify my abilities and to tutor me 
in both the Spanish language and the lan-
guage of the Spirit. Those two languages 
would be crucial to my missionary service.
 A few months in, I had a companion 
from El Salvador, Hermana Seravia. She was 
a great missionary and senior companion. 
One day she said to me, “Hermana, you are 
doing pretty good with Spanish, but you talk 
too much like a Book of Mormon! We don’t 
really say, ‘Now behold, we rejoice to be in 
your home.’”
 I have reflected a lot in the years since 
this experience about the way that calling 
unfolded. I know that the Lord is omniscient. 
Surely He knew that the people I was called 
to teach in Houston spoke Spanish and that 
I did not know Spanish when my call had 
been issued months earlier.
 So why did the Lord send me to Texas 
without MTC language training? At the time, 
if I were to have designed the experience 
for myself, I would have called me to learn 
Spanish in the MTC. However, although I 
have the power of choice and autonomy in 
many things, I am not the primary architect 
of my own life experiences. I am called to 
trust that the Lord has a plan for my life, just 
as I know that He has a plan for yours. Both 
the big picture and the smaller details are 
within His infinite and loving calculus.
 As it worked out, the experience was tai-
lored to draw upon my particular strengths 
and to fortify my particular weaknesses. The 
airport switcheroo meant that I could not 
lean upon my own capacities to learn Span-
ish as a purely intellectual exercise. I had to 
rely on the gifts and tutelage of the Spirit. I 
had to plead for the gift of tongues. I had to 
rely on the prayers of loved ones—the power 
of which I could feel bringing words and 
phrases to my mind and loosing my tongue 
as I taught. The Lord foresaw that Spanish 
would be a great blessing in my life but that 
learning to trust Him and rely on Him while 
learning the language of the Spirit was an 
even more important lesson.
 Sometimes we are asked to submit to 
ongoing ambiguity or to a grueling lesson 
we would prefer not to learn. Such moments 
provide us with the opportunity to realize 
one of the purposes of our mortal experi-
ence: to choose to trust Him to bless us with 
the experiences that we need rather than the 
experiences we might want.
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 As we put our trust in the Lord and lean 
not on our own limited understanding of 
eternal things, the individualized path He 
has designed for each of His children will 
unfold. It is marvelous to contemplate that 
although He is the great God of the universe 
and the works of His hands are beyond our 
numbering, each of us is known and loved 
by Him. Indeed, we are “graven . . . upon 
the palms of [His] hands.”19 To fulfill God’s 
purposes for our lives, we must learn to trust 
in His love and goodness, even in times 
when we feel alone—just as Jesus felt alone. 
It does not mean that we do not keenly feel 
the full weight of the pain of our trials—just 
as Jesus felt His mortal pain.
 The Savior felt the hunger, thirst, fatigue, 
rejection, grief, pain, and loneliness of His 
mortal experiences. He even asked that 
the unimaginable weight of His burden of 
sorrow and pain be removed, if possible. 
Matthew recorded that in the Garden of 
Gethsemane, Jesus told His disciples, “My 
soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto 
death.”20 The scripture tells us that so great 
was His suffering that “he went a little fur-
ther, and fell on his face, and prayed, saying, 
O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup 
pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but 
as thou wilt.”21
 The experience of Jesus in Gethsemane 
teaches me that it is not a sin to desire 
that we be spared some experiences or to 
ask that burdens be removed. The pain of 
those crossroads, in which our will and the 
Father’s will diverge, is profound. Neverthe-
less, Jesus modeled how such moments are 
best resolved: choosing, because of our love 
for the Father, to trust His will. We trust Him 
by receiving the Lord’s counsel rather than 
insisting that He take ours.
pr i nc i p l e  num b e r  3
Love Abundantly
The third principle that I would urge you 
to adopt is to love abundantly. In most any 
situation we face, love really is the answer. 
We can trust that the will of the Lord is 
motivated entirely by perfect love. When 
we cannot understand the things that are 
happening—or the things that are not hap-
pening—the one true constant is the perfect 
love of God. You can trust it entirely.
 Alma counseled the people of the 
Church to avoid contention and to have 
“their hearts knit together in unity and in 
love one towards another.”22 I have found 
that my happiness is multiplied and my 
challenges are dulled when I have opened 
my heart to be knit in loving ties to friends, 
colleagues, and family. The Savior com-
manded us to love even our enemies and to 
do good to those who despitefully use us.23 
My life is not defined by the blessings I have 
not received but by the abundance of love 
and blessings that I have received.
 My maternal grandmother, Norma 
Seneca, was a great example of expansive, 
abundant love. She lived her whole life on 
the Cattaraugus Reservation. Though her 
geographic frame of reference was limited, 
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her understanding and wisdom were wide 
and deep. I especially admired her ability to 
take genuine, full-throated joy in the good 
things that happened to others. I loved tell-
ing her my good news because she was so 
thrilled when good things happened to me. 
She never begrudged others their successes. 
She rejoiced with those who rejoiced. It was 
the habit of a generous spirit who multiplied 
and expanded the happiness of her life, even 
in the many difficulties she endured.
 It is not always easy to love. I have often 
called upon the wise counsel my mother 
gave me when I was relating to her some 
perceived injustice I had suffered. I insisted 
that my grievances were justified. Knowing 
she could not undo the injustice, my mother 
advised me to “throw a blanket of mercy” 
over the situation. In essence, she advised 
me to love, to forgive, and to show mercy 
even when I felt my demand for justice was 
valid. She urged me to let mercy pay the 
debt and satisfy my claims. This advice has 
saved me much anguish and provided me 
great relief when I have been able to heed 
it. Choosing to love is choosing to heal from 
the spiritual wounds inflicted by injustice 
and suffering.
 One important way that we magnify our 
love to others and to the Lord is through the 
words that we speak. Many Native American 
creation stories describe the world’s creation 
as having been brought about because the 
Creator spoke it. Speaking is, in a way, giving 
birth to ideas and forming and shaping our 
reality. Similarly, in the creation account in 
Genesis, we understand that God said, “Let 
there be light: and there was light.”24 One 
title for the Savior is “the Word.”25
 Our words are powerful beyond 
measure. Words have the power to create 
and heal, but they also have the power 
to destroy and wound. Let us speak with 
abundant love and use the power that is ours 
to heal and build others, just as the Savior 
uses His.
 Most important, we should not place 
conditions or limits on the love that we 
offer to our Father in Heaven and His Son. 
But even when we have done so, having 
withheld love or obedience, He stands ever 
ready to receive and heal us. As often as we 
will repent, He will forgive. His arms are 
ever outstretched. We can trust His love.
 So we ask: “Where can I turn for peace? 
. . . Where is the quiet hand to calm my 
anguish?”26
 Here is the reply: “He answers privately, 
Reaches my reaching In my Gethsemane, 
Savior and Friend. Gentle the peace he finds 
for my beseeching. Constant he is and kind, 
Love without end.”27
 My brothers and sisters, I testify that 
He is constant and kind. He is worthy of our 
trust and adoration. That we may choose to 
trust in Him during times of doubt or dif-
ficulty is my prayer, in the name of Jesus 
Christ, amen.
n o t e s
1 D&C 88:118.
2 “Where Can I Turn for Peace?” Hymns, 2002, no. 129.
3 Luke 6:38.
4  “ How Firm a Foundation,” Hymns, 2002, no. 85; see 
also 1 Peter 4:12.
5  See Arthur C. Parker, “The Constitution of the Five 
Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law,” in 
Parker on the Iroquois: Iroquois Uses of Maize and 
Other Food Plants; The Code of Handsome Lake, the 
Seneca Prophet; The Constitution of the Five Nations, 
ed. William N. Fenton (Syracuse, New York: Syra-
cuse University Press, 1968), 37, article 24 of “The 
Council of the Great Peace.” See also Wikipedia, s.v. 
“seven generation sustainability,” en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Seven_generation_sustainability.
6 Moroni 4:3, 5:2; D&C 20:77, 79.
7 Alma 36:3.
8  Neal A. Maxwell, “Enduring Well,” Ensign, April 
1997; see D&C 122:7.
9 Jacob 4:10.
10 2 Nephi 9:20.
11 2 Nephi 9:28.
12 2 Nephi 9:28–29.
13 Matthew 7:11.
14 3 Nephi 6:14.
15 3 Nephi 6:12.
16 Jacob 4:10.
17 1 Nephi 1:1 (Spanish).
18 1 Nephi 1:1.
19 See 1 Nephi 21:16; Isaiah 49:16.
20 Matthew 26:38.
21 Matthew 26:39.
22 Mosiah 18:21.
23 See Matthew 5:44.
24 Genesis 1:3.
25 John 1:1; see also verse 2.
26 “Where Can I Turn for Peace?”
27 “Where Can I Turn for Peace?”
a r t
Page 15: Minerva Teichert (1888–1976), Moroni and the 
Title of Liberty, c. 1930, oil in canvas, 72 x 1 5/16 x 108 
inches. Brigham Young University Museum of Art. Page 
16: Minerva Teichert (1888–1976), The Law on the Plates 
of Brass, 1949-1951, 36 x 48 inches. Brigham Young Uni-
versity Museum of Art, 1969. Page 19: Minerva Teichert 
(1888–1976), The Sacrament, 1949–1951, oil on masonite, 
36 x 48 inches. Brigham Young University Museum of Art, 
1969. Page 20: Minerva Teichert (1888–1976), Touch Me 
Not, 1937, oil on canvas, 76 1/2 x 59 3/4 inches. Brigham 
Young University Museum of Art.
+ + +
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“GRAVEN .   .   .  UPON THE PALMS  
OF [HIS] HANDS.” 
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First Amendment Harms
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David Rasheed Ali is an observant Muslim and a prison inmate 
who requested an exemption from the prison’s restrictive poli-
cies that prohibited him from wearing a kufi, a knit skullcap, 
as required by his religious beliefs.1 One might be tempted 
to conclude that wearing a kufi is both harmless and costless, 
making the decision to grant a religious exemption relatively 
straightforward. But even something as seemingly innocu-
ous as religious head coverings contains a number of hidden 
potential costs and harms: hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
estimated redistributed staff time and resources to implement 
a new policy;2 fewer resources for other inmates for better 
healthcare, activities, facilities, or food;3 heightened physical 
risk for prison guards who must enter an inmate’s “strike zone” 
to search personal items;4 and increased risk of deadly contra-
band being secreted in a headgear hiding spot.5
 On the other hand, failing to grant an exemption causes 
spiritual and dignitary harm to Ali, who must violate his con-
science. Additionally, numerous studies suggest that providing 
religious protections for inmates decreases prison violence and 
results in significant rehabilitative positive externalities, not 
just for other inmates and securities but for society at large.6 In 
light of these competing and varied externalities, how should 
we think about Ali’s religious exemption request?
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 These sorts of questions about harm related to religious 
exemptions are particularly weighty at this specific 
moment in history, when religious exemptions have perhaps never been more controver-
sial or hotly debated in legal scholarship. Especially in light of Supreme Court cases like 
Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop, some scholars have advanced new theories that 
would place strict limits on government’s ability to grant religious exemptions that result 
in harm to third parties who do not benefit from that religious practice.7 These theories 
have inspired recent legislation (including the 2019 Equality Act and the 2018 Do No Harm 
Act)8 and are gaining traction among some judges.9 And just recently, four Justices on the 
Supreme Court signaled that they may want to revisit the Court’s jurisprudence for offer-
ing religious exemptions.10
 Iterations of this theory, referred to in this article as the “third-party harm theory,” rely 
on both descriptive and normative claims. Descriptively, the theory asserts that Supreme 
Court cases are best understood as categorically prohibiting religious exemptions that result 
in cognizable harm to third parties. Normatively, other third-party theorists make the claim 
that it is “disturbing” to “forc[e] third parties to pay for the exercise of [religious] rights” of 
other parties.11
 What has not received attention in the literature is a theoretical critique of the generic 
harm principle on which the theory relies. Specifically, proponents of the third-party harm 
theory echo longstanding views—articulated long ago by John Stuart Mill—that the ability of 
individuals to exercise their religious rights depends on whether such liberty does not cause 
“harm to others.”12
 Third-party harm theorists take this harm principle a step further: Whereas Mill argued 
that harm was a necessary, though not always sufficient, condition justifying government 
interference with individual liberty, third-party harm theorists argue that the mere pres-
ence of harm is a sufficient condition requiring government restriction of religious rights. 
This significantly raises the stakes for determining what counts as cognizable harm under 
their theory.
Reliance on a harm principle as justification for government 
interference has strong intuitive appeal. At least superfi-
cially, it seems to be a theoretical shortcut for avoiding other difficult moral questions about 
which causes a government should or should not advance—a question on which there is little 
consensus in a pluralistic society. Pointing instead to harm seems like a neutral method for 
bypassing such moral conundrums. If this were true, there is no question that this method 
would present a desirable means of making a great many normative decisions in society. 
Indeed, this sort of principle for decision-making has been attempted in numerous fields over 
numerous decades, from criminal law to environmental law.13 But unfortunately, significant 
moral question begging is involved in determining what exactly we mean by “harm.”
 If the harm principle is broadened to include more expansive notions, like dignitary 
harm, arguably “every action generates some harm cognizable under the expanded harm 
principle.”14 Thus, any action would justify government restriction of rights. The most expan-
sive notion of harm would include a subjective understanding, where any perceived negative 
impact on someone counted as harm. Unless we use this broad subjective standard, then 
“harm” must become a term of art that includes some sorts of interests and excludes others. 
But once a technical definition has been adopted, that definition must operate on top of a 
deep normative theory about which types of harm count and why.
 The normative appeal of the harm principle stems from its superficial simplicity. But 
once “harm” becomes a term of art, the normative justification for the theory becomes quite 
complex.15 The plausibility of the harm principle is built on the assumption that there will be 
a consensus about what constitutes harm. But there is no such consensus, only a plurality of 
views of what harm is.16
THIRD-PARTY HARM THEORY
“HARM” AS A TERM OF ART
This is an 
abridged ver-
sion of an 
article soon to 
be published 
in the Indiana 
Law Journal: 
95 ind. L. J. 
(forthcoming 
2020).
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Indeed, the lack of consensus on harm is 
highlighted by the fact that three different 
groups of third-party harm theorists under-
stand harm as a term of art to mean three 
very different things: (1) a materiality stan-
dard, meaning a burden that is relevant to 
decision-making;17 (2) an undue hardship 
standard for subsets of the population;18 and 
(3) “targeted material or dignitary harms” 
on those who “do not share the [religious] 
claimant’s belief.”19 None of these scholars 
provide clear normative justifications on 
why certain types of harm count under their 
definition and others do not.
 In addition, recently proposed legisla-
tion inspired by iterations of these third-
party harm theories relies on an entirely 
different definition of harm, specifically 
the Do No Harm Act. This act defines 
harm as including a specific laundry list of 
events, such as any exemption from anti-
discrimination laws, provisions of health-
care services, and government contracting 
requirements.20 Given this utter lack of 
consensus on what should count as harm, it 
is not surprising that scholars in other fields 
have observed the way a heavy reliance on 
a generic harm principle almost always col-
lapses in upon itself.21
 The normative and doctrinal shortcomings with this undertheorized reliance on generic 
harm are highlighted by measuring the purported aims of this theory against its over- and 
underinclusive results. Specifically, it is overinclusive because if applied in an even-handed 
way, the theory would actually remove religious exemptions for groups like religious minori-
ties that third-party harm theorists generally acknowledge should receive protection.22 These 
groups include Muslim prison inmates, Sikhs in the workplace, and Amish communities.23 
The theory is normatively underinclusive because it fails to provide any explanation whatso-
ever for why some competing third-party harms are simply ignored in the calculus. Moreover, 
special prohibitions on religious harm, including things like dignitary harm, cannot be nor-
matively justified by the argument that such harms are unique. A comparison of the types of 
harm we permit in the speech context demonstrates that religious harm is quite similar in 
all meaningful respects.
Given the normative and descriptive shortcomings of 
the third-party harm theory, it is not surprising that 
courts are not, in fact, treating the presence of generic harm alone as categorically requiring 
the government to restrict religious rights. Instead, at times courts recognize and allow sig-
nificant amounts of harm to third parties in order to protect every type of First Amendment 
right—not just religious rights. While the presence of harm may be a necessary condition 
to justify the government’s restriction of First Amendment rights, the harm must also have 
certain characteristics.
                 LACK OF A TRUE DEFINITION
                 THREE TYPES OF HARM
In light of Supreme Court 
cases like Hobby Lobby and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, some 
scholars have advanced new 
theories that would place 
strict limits on government’s 
ability to grant religious 
exemptions that result in 
harm to third parties who do 
not benefit from that  
religious practice.
26 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
  Based on these characteristics, courts weigh a variety of competing harms, classifying 
them in three specific categories: (1) prohibited harms (which are categorically impermis-
sible); (2) probative harms (which can be balanced against one another); and (3) inadmissible 
harms (which are given no weight, regardless of how severely or disproportionately the third 
parties experience them). A careful review of religious exemption case laws reveals that 
courts are not treating any harm to third parties as categorically prohibited. And competing 
harms always arise in the context of the protection of First Amendment rights.
This descriptive framework has important normative 
implications. A clear understanding of the role that harm 
plays in courts’ treatment of various First Amendment rights highlights the fact that the 
protection of any right inherently concerns harms competing from either side of the ledger. 
The real question with which courts are often grappling is what the proper balance of “harm” 
ought to be. This framework does not treat the presence of any harm as a sufficient condi-
tion for restricting any right. Rather, it treats harm as part of an equation: however we are 
defining harm, it must be weighed in a consistent way for the government to determine the 
most socially beneficial outcome.
 In this vein, this article proposes three normative questions we should be asking to the 
extent that we are treating harm as a relevant moral consideration in the First Amendment 
context.
1 Are costs justified by the social goods they provide?
When we are not fixated on asking whether a particular right is harmful or not (acknowl-
edging that it always will be at some level), we can ask the much more fruitful normative 
question of whether inevitable costs are justified by providing important social goods.24 
Sometimes localized externalities are arguably balanced by a more diffuse social benefit. For 
example, one might consider the localized externalities resulting from state or local taxes 
related to the support of education in such a way.25 Even families who do not have school-age 
children benefit from having a more educated citizenry and even higher property values in 
their neighborhoods when schools are high quality.26 If we view externalities in this cost/
benefit context, perhaps the most important normative question to ask is whether the cost of 
a right is a “good deal” for society. Where the social goods that society receives in exchange 
for harm are significant, then protection of the right might be deemed a social bargain, not-
withstanding significant harm.27
 The costs and benefits of free speech provide a particularly salient example of this sort 
of trade-off. Free expression has been justifiably described as a very costly right,28 but free 
expression has also been described as one of America’s “most precious” rights because its 
protection provides enormous social goods generally enjoyed by society.29 These goods make 
it more likely that violations of other rights will be reported, operate as a precondition for 
democratic self-government, ensure political accountability, decrease government corrup-
tion and abuses of power, improve the quality of policy-making, and facilitate a host of other 
artistic, psychological, economic, moral, and even religious functions.30 In less-developed 
countries, freedom of speech has even helped prevent famines.31
 As Professor Joseph Raz has remarked:
If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of expression, but not having the 
right myself, or enjoying the right in a society which does not have it, I would have no hesitation in 
judging that my own personal interest is better served by the first option.32
In other words, individuals in a society without freedom of expression suffer more from the 
loss of social goods that such a society will inevitably experience than the individual would 
suffer from lacking such freedoms herself and yet living in a society that generally protects 
THREE NORMATIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT HARM
The protection  
of any right 
inherently  
concerns harms 
competing  
from either side  
of the ledger. 
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them. Protection of rights can thus secure goods for individuals far beyond those who actu-
ally enjoy the rights, which arguably justifies the high cost of protecting such rights.
 Freedom of religion has similarly been described as a right that provides a significant 
social bargain to society, notwithstanding its costs.33 This was something a number of the 
American founders believed. In his farewell address in 1796, President George Washington 
stated:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are 
indispensable supports. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and cher-
ish them.34
 This argument has contemporary force as well. As Professor Rick Garnett has observed, 
religious accommodation provides a number of social goods, even for those who do not prac-
tice a religion at all.35 One empirical study by Brian and Melissa Grim indicates that “[r]eli-
gion annually contributes nearly $1.2 trillion of socio-economic value to the U.S. economy.”36 
These include things like “130,000 alcohol recovery programs,” or “120,000 programs to 
help the unemployed,” or about 26,000 “active ministr[ies] to help people living with hiv-
aids.”37 Similarly, Professors Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein have argued that one of the 
most important contributions of religious liberty is “peaceable social coexistence,” as this 
right “permit[s] us to be autonomous in our deepest convictions” while still allowing “our 
religiously heterogeneous society to operate passably well.”38 Professor Douglas Laycock 
has likewise recently observed that protecting religious liberty “reduces social conflict” and 
“reduces human suffering.”39 Thus, Americans are willing to bear significant costs associated 
with rights imposed upon them in part because a whole range of precious public goods result 
from such protection of rights.
 The social benefits that flow from both free speech and religious rights suggest that thick 
protections of these rights are warranted, even if at times costly for society and for third par-
ties. These sorts of thick protections are illustrated by constitutional or statutory frameworks 
that require the government to satisfy strict scrutiny and demonstrate that it has a “compel-
ling” justification for disregarding free speech or religious rights. Indeed, this is the standard 
required under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (or rfra). But once the government 
can demonstrate a compelling interest, for purposes such as preventing otherwise unavoid-
able significant harm to third parties, then the normative explanation is that at this point 
the cost is too great. Protecting that right is no longer a social bargain, and thus other harms 
outweigh that religious harm. This is the sort of normative question—woven into current 
legal frameworks—that we ought to be asking.
2 Can institutions be modified to mitigate avoidable harms?
Professor Joel Feinberg argues in his classic work Harm to Others that some sorts of harm 
arise from “bad social institutions,” meaning institutions that cause conflicts that could be 
avoided, or at least mitigated, if the institution were modified.40 In other words, perhaps 
much criticism regarding harm lies within a policy or institution that puts religious believers 
and other rights on a predictable and easily avoidable clash of harms.
 For example, one of the high-profile contests of harms between religious liberty and 
third-party rights recently arose in the controversial case of Kim Davis, a former county clerk 
in Kentucky. After the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage, Ms. Davis was unwilling to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Ms. Davis was also unwilling to have any mar-
riage licenses for same-sex couples issued in her name. These religious objections resulted 
in preventing any same-sex couple in the county from obtaining a marriage license to which 
they were lawfully entitled. The denial of government services for these same-sex couples 
was a significant harm. On the other hand, Ms. Davis was ultimately sent to jail for five days 
and held in contempt of court because she was unwilling to violate her conscience.
 Other states handled similar conflicts of conscience in a very different way: by modifying 
their institutions to mitigate harm to both parties. Utah, for example, passed a law that would 
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allow clerks to opt out of performing marriages for conscience-based reasons, so long as the 
office ensured that a willing clerk was on duty and available to perform marriages for any 
couple who requested it.41 One need not agree with the policy or even the legality of such a 
compromise to acknowledge that this sort of institutional modification mitigated harms on 
both sides of the ledger.
3 Can the harm be distributed more justly?
A final important question is whether the distribution of harm is just with respect to how 
benefits flowing from harm are distributed when compared to how the corresponding harm 
is being distributed throughout society. As third-party harm theorists have rightly observed, 
a just society should work to defray costs that are disproportionately borne by a subset of 
the population. Relying on the work of Professor Frederick Schauer, third-party harm theo-
rists state, “It ought to be troubling whenever the cost of a general societal benefit must be 
borne exclusively or disproportionately by a small subset of the beneficiaries.”44 In many 
cases, government-funded alternatives to more evenly disperse externalities may provide 
precisely the sort of uncoupling of harm that Professor Schauer advocates for. And poten-
tial government-funded programs are relevant under the religious exemption framework 
of rfra. Indeed, this was an important concern for the Supreme Court in its Hobby Lobby 
decision under rfra’s “less restrictive alternative analysis.”
 In Hobby Lobby the Court noted that the “most straightforward way” of ensuring that 
harms would not be disproportionately born by third parties “would be for the Govern-
ment to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who 
are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’ 
religious objections.”45 The Court flirted with the idea that rfra may, at times, require the 
creation of “a new, government-funded program” in order to both accommodate religious 
exercise and avoid disproportionate harms to third parties.46 Some third-party harm theo-
rists have criticized this approach as “not politically viable,” which is certainly a reasonable 
practical concern.47
 However, on June 1, 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services proposed 
a new regulation that would expand the definition of “low-income family” under Title X 
to include “women who are unable to obtain certain family planning services under their 
employer-sponsored health insurance policies due to their employers’ religious beliefs or 
moral convictions.”48 This proposed rule would have ensured that if someone actually loses 
employer-sponsored contraceptive coverage as a result of religious exemptions, she will still 
have access to “free or low-cost family planning services,” including contraceptives.49 While 
only a proposed rule, this sort of expanded government program provides a good example of 
institutions or policies that can be revised so as to distribute harm more justly and decrease 
the magnitude of harm on both sides of the ledger. This line of inquiry may be a constructive 
area where both those who seek to avoid third-party harm and those who defend religious 
exemptions could find common-ground solutions aimed at dispersing any costs that society 
must incur to reap important social goods through the protection of conscience rights.
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The legal process is a far-reaching endeavor, with reverberations in many facets of 
society. It should come as no surprise, then, that law also impacts the visual arts. I study 
Christian devotional art in the medieval and early modern eras, and the paintings and 
sculptures produced in those periods frequently ruminate on ideal forms of jurispru-
dence and the administration of clemency and justice. Always hovering over earthly 
systems of justice is the Last Day, when souls will be consigned to heaven or hell by the 
great Judge, assisted by the advocacy of the Virgin Mary, St. John the Baptist, and other 
important saints who serve as “lawyers” for mankind in that final, celestial courtroom.
“
”
,

34 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
 
 To begin, let us think broadly about the ways in which art and law intersect. Art is fre-
quently used to represent certain legal principles, sometimes to such a degree that they 
become iconic. For instance, when we see a woman with a blindfold holding a sword and a 
pair of scales, we immediately know that she is an allegory of justice. But art gives voice to 
quite different aspects of legal practice as well. Iconoclasm—or the “destruction of images”—
is often connected to politics and law. In ancient Rome, when an emperor fell from favor 
and was condemned for crimes against the state, the senate would sometimes pass a dam-
natio memoriae, or “damnation of memory,” against him. One of the most significant ways 
the emperor’s memory was “damned” was by destroying his public portraits. Sometimes 
his images would be completely obliterated, but at other times a statue or painting might be 
only partially disfigured. For instance, the nose might be knocked off so that the emperor’s 
likeness would remain recognizable but now with punitive “scars” for all to see.1
 Art also reinforces the authority of the law. In a courthouse you might find portraits of 
local or national rulers—sometimes positioned directly above the bench—in order to indicate 
the judge’s source of authority. In early modern Europe, when someone was condemned 
to death by hanging, a friar would sometimes hold an image of the crucified Christ on a 
pole near the face of the condemned so that the last thing the dying man or woman looked 
upon would be the dying Savior.2 In this way, the likeness of their ultimate Judge would be 
imprinted on their minds and perhaps even aid their penitential process, inspiring a last 
chance at mercy.
ART AND LEGAL DISPUTE
Among the most dramatic intersections of art and law are the notorious legal battles sur-
rounding high-profile works with disputed ownership or histories of theft. Gustav Klimt’s 
Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I is a lavishly gilded painting completed in 1907 during the peak 
of the Austrian art nouveau style ( Jugendstil ). Recently made famous by the film Woman in 
Gold, the portrait depicts the Jewish Viennese heiress Adele Bloch-Bauer.
 Bloch-Bauer had a large art collection, which she left to her husband when she died in 
1925. In 1938, on the verge of World War II, Austria was annexed to Germany, and Bloch-
Bauer’s husband—also a Jew—fled to Switzerland, where he later died in 1945. Rather than 
being passed to surviving family, the couple’s paintings fell into the hands of the Nazis, who 
amassed priceless collections of confiscated art. Hitler was himself an amateur artist and 
as a young man even aspired to become a painter. Much of the art stolen by the Third Reich 
came from Jewish victims of the regime. Some paintings and sculptures were returned to 
their owners after the war, but many are still lost, unclaimed, or under dispute.
 When the Nazis fell from power, the Austrian state claimed some of the stolen art, includ-
ing the Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I, which ended up as a signature piece in the Klimt col-
lection of the Austrian Gallery. But then in 1998, Adele Bloch-Bauer’s niece, Maria Altmann, 
asserted her rights to her aunt and uncle’s art collection. The Austrian Gallery responded 
that the portrait was the property of the state and that it would not be returned to the family. 
A legal battle ensued, and eventually Altmann won the dispute. Today the Portrait of Adele 
Bloch-Bauer I hangs in New York City in the Neue Galerie. This case is just one instance of 
the intrigue and crime that accrue to some of the world’s most coveted works of art.
previous page: 
Gustav Klimt (1862–1918). 
Adele Bloch-Bauer I. 1907. 
Photo: Neue Galerie New 
York / Art Resource, NY.
IN THE COURT OF THE HEAVENLY JUDGE
Depictions of Judgment Day take pride of place on the spectrum of legal images. A particu-
larly iconic example from the early Renaissance in Burgundy is the Beaune Altarpiece Last 
Judgment, painted by Rogier van der Weyden in the mid-15th century. It was once the cen-
terpiece of the chapel in the Hôtel-Dieu, a richly endowed hospital for the poor in Beaune, 
France. Renaissance hospitals functioned primarily as hospices, making the sick comfort-
able in their last weeks of life. Care for the soul and spiritual preparation for death were the 
primary objectives for the hospital staff, and at the Hôtel-Dieu, the beds were arranged so 
that the dying could contemplate Rogier’s Last Judgment.
 In the altarpiece, Christ sits on a rainbow directly above St. Michael the Archangel, who 
assists the Lord by weighing souls on a large pair of scales. The screaming soul tilting the 
right-hand balance down is labeled “Peccata” (sins), while the soul on the left is light and 
unburdened and labeled “Virtutes” (virtues). St. Michael fixes the viewers—dying patients in 
the hospital—with his razor gaze, asking them to consider their own end.3 Would their souls 
be light with virtue or heavy with sin when they stood at God’s judgment bar?
 Meanwhile, Christ appears as a perfectly impartial judge—perfect justice balanced with 
perfect mercy.4 Although his face is impassive, he displays the wounds in his hands, feet, and 
side as wellsprings of compassion and badges of redemption. His scarlet cloak seems dyed 
in his own blood, the blood of “the Lamb that was slain.”5
 On the Lord’s right is a lily of mercy with white letters that run upward toward his face, 
reading, “Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the 
foundation of the world.”6 On Christ’s left, the sword of justice is accompanied by dark red 
letters, which tumble downward like the cascading folds of his cloak, mimicking the fall of 
the damned down to hell. These words read, “Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting 
fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.”7 Meanwhile, the Virgin Mary and St. John the 
Baptist—mankind’s two most powerful intercessors before the throne of the great Media-
tor himself—fall to their knees in advocacy for the souls below, who beseech them for their 
prayers as they rise from the ground in the Resurrection.
 Rogier’s clear and orderly view of Judgment Day, with its cast of assistant judges 
and saintly “attorneys,” is in keeping with centuries-old iconographic conventions. Not 
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Weyden (ca. 1399–1464). 
Altar of the Last Judgment. 
1434. Photo: Erich Lessing  
/ Art Resource, NY.
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sometimes provide clothes for the saved in representations of the Last Judgment. Those who 
are found unworthy of God’s presence are left to burn in their nakedness forever. The spare 
number of souls entering into heaven on the left of Rogier’s altarpiece attests to the common 
Renaissance belief that the majority of humanity would not make it to the celestial city.
AN AMBIGUOUS DOOMSDAY
Another Last Judgment scene, albeit from much later in the Renaissance, is Michelangelo 
Buonarroti’s great altarpiece fresco for the Sistine Chapel in Rome. It had been more than 
20 years since he had completed his work on the Sistine ceiling, and by the time he returned 
to paint the Last Judgment, his style had changed. Michelangelo is generally grouped in the 
Italian High Renaissance, an art historical period characterized by idealized figures, balance, 
symmetry, harmonious colors, and often a stable, triangular organizing principle.
 In his later life, however, Michelangelo increasingly exhibited conventions known as 
Mannerism. Mannerist art exaggerates High Renaissance idealism to the point of artificiality. 
It exaggerates, distorts, uses strange colors, alters anatomical proportions, and twists figures 
into cramped, uncomfortable, and sometimes impossible positions. These conventions cre-
ate an idiosyncratic beauty, often embedded with erudite references. In fact, Mannerist art 
has much in common with poetry, in which the natural cadence and lexicon of language is 
“forced” into an artificial meter or rhyming sequence for aesthetic and expressive purposes.
 In contrast to Rogier’s predictable, orderly view of the heavenly court, chaos seems to 
reign in the Sistine fresco. There is no clearly defined triangular compositional structure. 
Instead, angels, saints, and sinners alike swirl in a blue vortex. Christ and his attendants 
have all of heaven in which to move, and yet somehow it feels as if there is not enough space. 
The ring of apostles surrounding the Lord, for instance, is hopelessly cramped. Additionally, 
the proportions of the figures are inaccurate. The oddly beardless Christ is titanic in size, as 
if emulating Roman statues of the god Apollo, while the Virgin Mary is much too little and 
appears to cower beside him.11 Illogically, the figures at the bottom of the fresco and closest 
to the viewer are the smallest, with the scale increasing higher up in the sky.
 It has been suggested that the exaggerated, “unsettled” quality of Mannerist art may 
be connected to a general anxiety that characterized the early 16th century. The Protestant 
far from the Hôtel-Dieu, the French town 
of Autun is home to a renowned Last Judg-
ment relief carved over the portal of the 
12th-century church of Saint-Lazare.8 One 
of the most noticeable differences between 
Saint-Lazare’s organized vision of divine 
justice and Rogier’s is the treatment of hell. 
In the former, monstrous, claw-like hands 
descend to strangle the damned while 
other souls with distended jaws scream. 
In Rogier’s composition, by contrast, the 
damned are not being forced to their doom 
by demons or pitchforks. Rather they run 
into hell of their own volition, chased from 
God’s presence by the indictment of their 
consciences.9 Rogier’s Renaissance depic-
tion of hell is arrestingly psychological.
 Last Judgment portrayals are among the 
few medieval and early Renaissance scenes 
that nearly always include nude figures. The 
souls raised from the dead in Rogier’s paint-
ing and brought before the bar of God are 
naked, echoing Job’s words, “Naked came I 
out of my mother’s womb, and naked shall I 
return thither: the Lord gave, and the Lord 
hath taken away.”10 The nudity also points 
to God’s omniscience at Judgment Day—he 
knows everything about each soul and noth-
ing can be hidden from him. But just as God 
clothed Adam and Eve after they shame-
fully acknowledged their nudity, angels 
Gislebertus. Close up 
of element of The Last 
Judgment. Ca. 1130. 
Autun Cathedral, 
Burgundy, France. 
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Reformation destabilized the sociopolitical 
landscape of Western Europe, and in 1527 
the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V invaded 
and sacked Rome.12 Whether or not these 
events directly affected Michelangelo’s art, 
anxiety certainly pervades his fresco. Even 
the saints surrounding Christ and assisting 
him in the judgment look doubtful about the 
state of their souls. Many of them hold the instruments of their martyrdoms or other identifi-
able attributes: St. Andrew with a cross, St. Peter with “the keys of the kingdom,”13 and St. 
Lawrence with the grill on which he was allegedly roasted to death. St. Bartholomew, said to 
be flayed alive, appears to the right and just below the Lord, holding a knife and his own skin, 
as if it were an old coat. The flayed face—distorted and askew in the folds of loose skin—is a 
self-portrait of Michelangelo.14
 Traditionally, saved souls appear on Jesus’s right, welcomed into paradise by his hand 
lifted in blessing, while the damned are cast off on his left. Michelangelo’s Christ, however, 
makes curiously ambiguous gestures. His right hand is raised in a powerful but forbidding 
manner, while his left hand is much gentler. Although the left-hand gesture could be inter-
preted as softly pushing souls aside, the fingers come surprisingly close to making the ancient 
sign of benediction.15 In light of the violent struggles over salvation and heresy in the wake 
of the Reformation, the uncertainty embedded in Michelangelo’s conception of doomsday 
rattles viewers’ confidence in their standing within God’s legal system.16
 Shrinking beneath her son’s heavy hand, the Virgin Mary seems at a loss, incapable of 
getting an intercessory word in edgewise. On Christ’s left, horrific monsters pull souls down 
Michelangelo Buonarroti 
(1475–1564). Sistine Chapel 
with the retable of the Last 
Judgment (Fall of the Damned). 
1534–41. Photo: Erich Lessing 
/ Art Resource, NY. 
=
Looming over  
the celebrant at the  
altar, Charon  
communicates to the  
papal court the  
distressingly  
ambiguous message  
of the entire  
painting: 
no one is safe. 
=
38 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
 
reference mythological stories, including 
Apollo’s ruthless retribution against the 
foolish and presumptuous satyr Marsyas—a 
grim portent of things to come.21
 The grisly punishment of Sisamnes 
occupies the foreground of the right panel. 
Like the mythological Marsyas, he has been 
condemned to be flayed alive. Cambyses 
looks on solemnly, like an impassive rep-
resentative of the divine Judge in the heav-
ens. One of the most disturbing details in 
the composition concerns the executioner 
on the right, near Sisamnes’s foot. Needing 
both of his hands to grip the judge’s skin, he 
has temporarily stowed his blood-stained 
knife between his teeth. Equally gruesome 
is the story’s epilogue in the background of 
the right panel, where Sisamnes’s young son 
has replaced his father on the judgment seat. 
Lest the son ever be tempted to take bribes 
himself, the back of his throne has been hung 
with his father’s skin as a visceral reminder.
to the inferno. According to Giorgio Vasari’s 16th-century biography of Michelangelo, the 
man in the lower right corner surrounded by devils and wrapped in serpents is a portrait of 
the papal master of ceremonies, who complained to the pope that Michelangelo had included 
too much nudity in the fresco. Michelangelo supposedly painted him into hell in retribution 
for his criticism.17 The Sistine Last Judgment uses both the traditional convention of torturing 
demons to haul the damned away to hellfire and Rogier’s more psychological punishment, 
with the weight of conscience and eternal guilt crushing them down to the fiery pit.
 The positioning of the Last Judgment within the Sistine Chapel has stirring implications. 
For hundreds of years, this sacred space has been reserved for solemn liturgies and conclaves 
to elect new popes. While celebrating mass at the chapel altar, the pope, cardinals, and assis-
tants would face Michelangelo’s fresco. Their vision would most readily be filled not with 
the blessed in paradise but rather with frightening images, including the green, demonic 
figure of Charon, who in Greco-Roman mythology rows souls across the River Styx into 
the underworld. The monstrous demigod is here beating his luckless passengers with an 
oar. Looming over the celebrant at the altar, Charon communicates to the papal court the 
distressingly ambiguous message of the entire painting: No one is safe. All are in danger of 
being smitten by Charon’s oar and the condemning hand of the divine Judge.
IMPLEMENTING DIVINE LAW IN THE SECULAR SPHERE
Renaissance notions of justice, punishment, and jurisprudence were also expounded in more 
secular works of art. In the duchy of Burgundy, where Rogier lived and worked, town halls 
were important centers for legal debates, municipal legislation, and rulings. The city of Bruges 
in modern-day Belgium is known today for its chocolate shops, waffles, and dark canals with 
swans. In the 15th century, however, Bruges and its town hall were the epicenter of the Burgun-
dian court. The city magistrates commissioned Gerard David, one of Bruges’s most preeminent 
artists, to paint a narrative of “righteous judgment” in order to remind them of their scriptural 
mandate “to do justly, and to love mercy.”18
 David’s Judgment of Cambyses depicts a Persian emperor and a corrupt judge on two 
panels. The paintings make use of “continuous narrative,” meaning that different moments 
in the story play out in the same space. In the background of the left panel, a judge named 
Sisamnes is accepting a clandestine bribe in exchange for legal indemnity. In the fore-
ground, allegations of corruption have reached the ears of Emperor Cambyses, and he 
confronts Sisamnes at his judgment seat. Significantly, the architectural setting depicted 
by David includes reference to a contemporary municipal space in Bruges known as the 
Poortersloge.19 Moreover, Cambyses’s retinue of officials are likely portraits of Bruges’s own 
justice officers.20 Those men would have carefully pondered the moral of the painting in 
precisely the way that the Persian magistrates closely observe their emperor’s model of 
disciplinary action.
 Cambyses uses his fingers to enumerate the charges leveled against Sisamnes as a 
thuggish figure takes the condemned judge by the arm to lead him away. Sisamnes’s face 
betrays his fear of the law, and the classical roundels mounted on the wall behind his throne 
Gerard David (ca. 1460–1523). 
The Judgment of Cambyses 
(left panel). 1498. Photo: 
Groeningemuseum / hip 
/ Art Resource, NY. 
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 Although chilling in its severity, the paintings’ message expresses Bruges’s unflinching 
allegiance to “do justly.” There is less evidence, at least in this particular case study, of the 
city’s commitment to “love mercy”!
CONFESSION AND RECOMPENSE
At the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries, the Italian Baroque artist Michel-
angelo Merisi da Caravaggio painted a triad of canvases for a small chapel in the Roman 
church of San Luigi dei Francesi. The chapel had been founded by Matthieu Cointerel, a 
wealthy French cardinal better known by the Italian version of his name: Matteo Contarelli. 
Contarelli died in 1585, and his heirs commissioned Caravaggio to complete the plans for 
the altar of Contarelli’s church.
 Caravaggio’s commission came in the wake of a posthumous indictment against Cardinal 
Contarelli for abusing his high position as papal datary by funneling large sums of Church 
money into his own pocket. Contarelli’s heirs, embarrassed by the crime, likely instructed 
Caravaggio to make the paintings into a kind of public penance for the late cardinal. By 
depicting Matteo Contarelli’s name saint—St. Matthew—Caravaggio uses the story of the 
evangelist’s conversion as a model for the cardinal’s restitution.22
 Among these three paintings, The Calling of St. Matthew foregrounds the themes of con-
fession and conversion with particular force. The scriptures identify St. Matthew as a tax 
collector, whom Jesus found “at the receipt of custom” and to whom he said, “Follow me.”23 
That call is the dramatic high point of the composition, even though Christ is at first difficult 
to recognize. Looking like an ordinary Ital-
ian man with a halo barely visible, he ges-
tures to St. Matthew from the shadows on 
the right edge of the canvas.
 Caravaggio painted during the after-
math of the great Tridentine Reform of the 
Church. Also known as the Counter Refor-
mation, this movement reasserted Roman 
Catholic doctrine in the face of Protestant 
heresies, sought to cleanse the Church of 
abuses, and actively promoted didactic, 
inspiring, and devotional works of art. In 
this vein, Caravaggio’s revolutionary com-
positions are extremely relatable and involve 
the viewer in a deeply faith-promoting 
way. In fact, Caravaggio leaves a place for 
the viewer at the table where St. Matthew 
and his fellow publicans sift through their 
money. A worshiper in Contarelli’s chapel 
could imaginatively scoot up a chair, enter 
the biblical narrative, and join the evangelist 
in considering the Lord’s timeless invitation 
to choose him over the cares of the world.
 The dramatic beam of light coming 
from the right follows the angle of Christ’s 
pointing finger and shines down on St. Mat-
thew’s face.24 The other two tax collectors 
at the far end of the table are completely 
oblivious to this climactic event. One 
of them even wears corrective lenses to 
underscore his sharp vision, and yet he is 
spiritually blind, totally unaware that God 
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himself stands in the room and beckons. 
The second publican bends forward and 
peers intently at the money. St. Matthew 
finds himself caught between two poles—
the pointed gesture of Christ on the one 
hand and his lucrative trade on the other. 
In a moment he will make his choice, as will 
the pious viewer imaginatively sitting at the 
table with him, for in the words of St. Mat-
thew’s own gospel, “[y]e cannot serve God 
and mammon.”25
 Significantly, the evangelist parrots the Lord’s gesture, pointing to himself as if seeking 
affirmation that he has interpreted the call correctly. His pointing finger, however, specifically 
gestures to his own heart, anticipating another passage from his gospel that comments on 
spiritual versus physical wealth: “For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.”26
 Christ’s gesturing hand is an artistic “quotation” directly lifted by Caravaggio from 
Michelangelo’s famous Creation of Adam on the Sistine Chapel ceiling. In that fresco, God 
the Father extends his arm, having just ignited Adam with “the breath of life.”27 Adam holds 
his left hand in the gesture emulated by Caravaggio, pointing to God as the divine origin of 
his newly “living soul.”28 St. Paul famously identified a theological link between Christ and 
Adam upon which Caravaggio’s “quotation” depends. Christ becomes the “new Adam” who 
redeems the parent of the human race and all his descendants: “For since by man came death, 
by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall 
all be made alive.”29
 In medieval and early modern theology, after God had created Adam and Eve “in his own 
image,”30 they “disfigured” their divine resemblance to him with sin. In order for the exiled 
descendants of Adam and Eve to regain paradise, God created another man in his own image: 
Christ, who St. Paul describes as “the image of God,” “the image of the invisible God,” and 
“the express image of his person.”31 It is Christ’s perfect and untainted likeness to God that 
empowers him to save a fallen world and invite even the most disfigured children of Adam 
and Eve to come and follow him. The gesture of Caravaggio’s distressingly ordinary, even 
grimy-looking Jesus identifies him as the “new Adam,” calling St. Matthew to be recreated.32 
Michelangelo Buonarroti 
(1475–1564). Sistine Chapel. 
The Creation of Adam. Ca. 
1511. Photo: Erich Lessing  
/ Art Resource, NY. 
c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m 41
“Follow me,” he seems to say, “and I will make you a fisher of men, I will make you an apostle, 
I will make you an evangelist, I will make you a martyr for my name.”33
 Recall that post-Reformation Europe was riven with turmoil, with Protestants and Catho-
lics killing one another. This was also an era of zealous evangelization efforts when priests 
risked their lives to minister to underground Catholics in hostile nations and the great Jesuit 
missions took Christianity to far-flung corners of the globe. Caravaggio’s painting, with its 
swooping diagonal lines, viewer-involving composition, and theatrical contrast of inky black 
with brilliant highlights, was intended to confront viewers with the zeal of Tridentine Europe. 
Visitors to Contarelli’s chapel should ask themselves, “Is Christ calling me? Have I given him 
my heart? Am I in danger of choosing mammon, heresy, or vices instead of him?”34
 The converting call of the painting is also the confession of another Matthew—a Matteo 
fixated on money to such an extent that he became a 17th-century incarnation of the hated 
tax collectors employed by ancient Rome.35 Petitions were made for Contarelli’s soul at the 
altar in his chapel, and the surrounding paintings voice the hope that the light of Christ, 
which in Caravaggio’s composition pierces the darkness to shine on St. Matthew, might reach 
even the soul of Cardinal Matteo suffering in purgatory.36
 Interestingly, full restitution was never made for Contarelli’s crimes. The breadth of his 
mismanagement of funds was so great that Pope Sixtus V closed the case, fearing interna-
tional repercussions.37 In a sense, Caravaggio’s painting itself functions as a recompense 
for Contarelli’s embezzlement, both symbolically and literally. As if acting for the cardinal 
by proxy, St. Matthew leaves his nets and follows Christ,38 modeling the repentant behavior 
Contarelli failed to pursue. Again acting in the cardinal’s behalf, Contarelli’s heirs appropri-
ated a portion of his tainted inheritance to beautify a holy place, giving a form of retribution 
to the demands of divine justice.
MATERNAL ADVOCACY
Johannes Vermeer, who like Caravaggio was active in the 17th century, is one of the most 
beloved painters of the Dutch Golden Age. He came from the city of Delft in the Netherlands 
and was known for his meticulously crafted canvases, usually filled with natural light and 
virtuosic renderings of texture. Vermeer’s works often feature solitary women in the corner 
of a room, absorbed in a household task.
 The subject matter of Dutch art shifted dramatically after the Reformation. The Nether-
lands were largely converted to Protestantism, especially Calvinism, which had an extreme 
intolerance for figural representations of God, Christ, angels, and saints. During the sec-
ond half of the 16th century, groups of Calvinists in the Low Countries engaged in icono-
clastic riots, systematically breaking and pillaging the stained glass, statues, and paintings 
of Catholic churches. The Iconoclastic Fury (Beeldenstorm) had been quelled by the time 
Vermeer began painting, but Dutch society still looked askance at traditional religious art. 
The prosperous middle class in the Dutch Republic favored smaller paintings of cityscapes, 
landscapes, still life, portraiture, and genre scenes. This last category characterizes much of 
Vermeer’s output, namely images of daily life.
 Vermeer’s Woman Holding a Balance appears, at first, to be a typical genre scene. A well-
dressed woman stands pensively in a corner, occupied with a balance and jewelry boxes. In 
the past, the painting was interpreted as a “moralizing genre scene,” following a popular 
Calvinist tradition of communicating a heavy-handed moral by depicting foolish men and 
women engaged in vices. Under this assumption, Vermeer’s woman would be a demonstra-
tion of avarice, as she weighs her jewels.39 In fact the painting was even initially titled A 
Woman Weighing Pearls to foreground this interpretation. When close examination revealed 
that there was not so much as a shadow of a pearl on her scales, however, the painting was 
retitled and its message reconsidered.40 Indeed, it is difficult to look at this beatific, quiet 
woman and seriously label her as a corrupt exemplar of avarice.
 Rather, this is a painting about good motherhood. The highest ideal for a 17th-century 
Dutch woman was to be a noble mother who instructed her children in right and wrong and 
raised promising citizens for the new repub-
lic.41 Vermeer’s woman has a slightly pro-
truding belly, which may indicate that she 
is pregnant. Holding one of the most ancient 
emblems of justice in one hand, this mother 
seems to be pondering much weightier 
things than the worth of her jewels. In fact, 
she is likely musing on her duty to teach her 
unborn baby. That maternal instruction will 
not only affect the child’s ability to weigh 
between right and wrong but will ultimately 
affect his or her fate at Judgment Day when 
weighed in God’s scales.
 The Dutch were remarkably tolerant of 
different religious groups in their republic. 
They knew what persecution felt like, hav-
ing endured the violent enforcement of 
religious orthodoxy under the rule of the 
Spanish King Philip II and his successors, 
followed by harsh Protestant and Catholic 
regimes in the southern Low Countries. As 
a result, the newly formed Dutch Repub-
lic had an open-door policy to all forms of 
Protestantism, and the government even 
offered Jews relative freedom. All were 
welcome, with the exception of Catholics. 
And yet even though mass was prohibited 
and priests were outlawed, the authori-
ties tended to turn a blind eye to the many 
Catholics in the Netherlands. There is 
strong evidence that Vermeer was one of 
these underground believers.42 Catholic 
references in his paintings range from bra-
zenly overt to quite subtle. The full depth 
of maternal advocacy invoked by Woman 
Holding a Balance is only realized when its 
Catholic overtones are considered.
 It is difficult to discount the shadow 
of the Virgin Mary that hovers over this 
expectant young mother in a blue coat 
with a white scarf draped over her head.43 
Blue and white are traditional colors for 
the Virgin, and during this same period the 
Spanish Church insisted that artists dress 
the Mother of God in white and blue when 
depicting the Immaculate Conception.44 
Immaculate Conception images envision 
the Madonna according to St. John’s vision 
of a woman “with child,” recorded in the 
book of Revelation: “And there appeared a 
great wonder in heaven; a woman clothed 
with the sun, and the moon under her 
feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve 
stars.”45 It may be significant, in this regard, 
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 that Vermeer’s woman wears a sun-gold 
dress with her pregnant belly swathed in a 
glowing patch of sunlight.46
 Behind the woman, a Last Judgment 
scene hangs on the wall, with the dead rising 
from their graves while saints and apostles 
flank Christ. The woman seems to join the 
cast of characters behind her, taking the 
role of the tenderly interceding Virgin. Her 
downcast eyes draw attention to the hordes 
of newly resurrected men and women who 
appear to clamor around her face, as if rais-
ing their arms to call on her gentle advocacy.
 The interpretation of the woman as a 
middle-class Dutch mother is by no means 
mutually exclusive with Vermeer’s evoca-
tion of the Virgin Mary. In Roman Catholic 
theology, the Lord’s beloved mother is also 
the spiritual mother of all Christians, so 
appointed by Christ himself when, look-
ing down from the cross on Calvary, he 
commanded St. John—and all believers by 
implication—to “[b]ehold thy mother!”47 
The faithful call on Mother Mary to advocate 
for them, just as any good mother advocates 
for her children, trusting that her interven-
tion can shift the balance in the scales at the 
Last Day.
 In a way both domestic and eternal in 
scope, Vermeer enshrines maternal advo-
cacy at the heart of his painting. A tender 
Marian prayer known as the Salve Regina 
resonates with the imagery of Woman Hold-
ing a Balance and brings together the forces 
of divine justice, clemency, and advocacy in 
the early modern Christian cosmos. Most 
practicing Catholics would have been inti-
mately familiar with the Salve Regina, and 
many could have recited it by heart:
 Hail Holy Queen, Mother of Mercy. Hail 
our life, our sweetness, and our hope. To thee 
do we cry, poor banished children of Eve; to thee 
do we send forth our sighs, mourning and weep-
ing in this vale of tears. Turn then, most gra-
cious advocate, thine eyes of mercy toward us 
and after this our exile show unto us the blessed 
fruit of thy womb, Jesus. O clement, O loving, O 
sweet Virgin Mary!48
EMULATING HEAVENLY COURTS
Imitation played a pivotal role in early 
modern Christian devotion, with believers 
striving to conform themselves to Christ. 
Images of law and justice bear witness to 
a similar model of imitation. Civic trials 
emulated the heavenly court, the Church 
preached the Final Judgment of all souls, 
and the faithful petitioned the mediating 
Lamb of God for mercy and asked his hosts 
of saintly advocates for prayers. The sacred 
and the secular were closely wound in all 
aspects of European culture, including the 
law. At the crux of the intersection of scrip-
tural mandates, legends, legal precedents, 
and pictorial expositions of jurisprudence 
was the “Judge of all the earth,” who per-
fectly exemplifies his own command “to do 
justly, and to love mercy.”49
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hen Hillary Newton 
Kleinhenz, ’18, was 
sworn in to the 
Indiana State Bar on May 14, 
2019, it was “powerful and spe-
cial,” Kleinhenz recalls. “Walking 
into the Indiana Roof Ballroom 
before the Indiana Supreme 
Court justices, magistrates, and 
federal judges felt intimidating 
and yet comfortable.” It was 
made even more memorable 
for her when Chief Justice 
Loretta Rush asked Kleinhenz 
to stand and then introduced 
her to the other inductees and 
the entire audience. Judge Rush 
used this introduction to make 
sure everyone knew why Judge 
Christopher Newton, ’89, had 
been chosen to swear in the 
2019 inductees: Judge Newton is 
Kleinhenz’s father.
Following in Her Father’s 
Footsteps
Growing up, Kleinhenz had a 
lot of interaction with attor-
neys and judges because of her 
father’s profession. She felt a 
pull toward law school, so after 
earning a bachelor’s degree 
from Utah State University, 
Kleinhenz followed in her 
father’s footsteps and attended 
byu Law.
 She explains that the 
opportunities to serve dur-
ing law school were the most 
valuable aspect of her educa-
tion: “I believe byu Law excels 
in preparing students to enter 
the workforce and be thought-
ful, intentional, and hardwork-
ing attorneys, and it goes 
beyond that by encouraging 
pro bono and volunteer efforts. 
Participating in the Public 
Interest Law Foundation for 
three years, [taking] two  
trips to Dilley, Texas, and 
working under Professor 
Carl Hernandez to open the 
Community Legal Clinic are 
among my most valuable expe-
riences at byu Law.”
 Kleinhenz has most recently 
been the recipient of a byu 
Public Service Fellowship for her 
work at the Office of the Federal 
Public Defender in Del Rio, 
Texas, and at the Vigo County 
Public Defender’s Office in 
Terre Haute, Indiana. In addition 
to criminal defense, she hopes 
to do more public interest work. 
As a military spouse, Kleinhenz 
wants to help each state 
provide better benefits, both 
legal and nonlegal, to spouses 
of veterans and those serving 
in active duty and the reserves. 
She belongs to the Military 
Spouse JD Network, which is 
an organization that advocates 
for licensing accommodations 
W
Two Generations of BYU Law 
By Rebecca Walker Clarke
Left to right: Anne 
Newton McFadden, 
Kleinhenz's cousin 
and associate dean of 
placement at Indiana 
University’s Maurer 
School of Law in 
Bloomington, Indiana; 
Hillary Newton Klein-
henz; and Judge Chris-
topher Newton. 
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for military spouse attorneys, 
provides education about the 
challenges of military life, and 
offers a network of support. Her 
hope is to use her law degree 
“to be an advocate each day.”
A Life-Changing Experience
Almost three decades before 
his daughter Hillary walked 
through the doors of the J. 
Reuben Clark Law School, Judge 
Newton began creating his own 
path through the law. Newton 
describes his byu Law education 
as a “marvelous experience.” 
He was the vice president of 
the Student Bar Association 
and worked closely with then 
dean Bruce C. Hafen and then 
associate dean H. Reese Hansen. 
Because of his involvement in 
student government, Newton 
knew almost everyone in his 
class. “Some I’m still very 
close to, and we still speak on 
a weekly or monthly basis,” 
he says. “The professors and 
administrators were excellent 
and truly cared about us, and 
we loved them too.”
 After graduating from 
byu Law in 1989, Newton 
became an associate and 
partner in the Indiana law firm 
Wright, Shagley & Lowery 
PC until his election as Vigo 
Superior Court Division IV 
judge in 2004. Newton was 
reelected and unopposed in 
2010 and 2016 and has served 
for three terms as chief judge of 
the Vigo Superior Courts. He is 
now the longest-serving judge 
in Vigo County.
 As much as byu Law prepared 
him for the rigors of his profes-
sional life, one of Newton’s law 
professors, Ray J. Davis, taught 
Newton a life-changing lesson: 
“[Davis] told us the purpose of the 
Law School wasn’t to prepare us 
as lawyers but to eventually pre-
pare us for service to the Church.” 
That principle has been a guiding 
one in Newton’s life. Newton has 
remained a devoted and service-
oriented member of The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints. He has served as Young 
Men president at both the ward 
and stake levels, as a bishop, 
and as a counselor in a stake 
presidency. He is currently the 
second counselor in the Indiana 
Indianapolis Mission presidency, 
serving with Darryl Carlson, ’78, 
also a byu Law graduate.
The Greatest Honor
Newton says that although a life 
in the law is rewarding, there 
are difficulties that accompany 
it: “I’ve had a lot of great things 
happen in my career. Much of 
what I do as a judge, however, is 
sad. People are losing their lib-
erty, their families, their money, 
and their property.” Newton 
offsets some of this sadness 
by performing more marriages 
in the county than anyone 
else—“in part because it allows 
me to do something happy,” he 
says. This has earned him the 
nickname “Love Judge” among 
his staff.
 He recounts that the experi-
ence of swearing in Kleinhenz 
was one of the happiest things 
he has been able to do. “I was 
seated next to the Indiana 
attorney general, Curtis Hill. He 
turned to me and asked, ‘What 
was the better day: her birth or 
today?’ I thought for a moment 
and said, ‘Today. It was wonder-
ful when she was born. She was 
the third of four children, and at 
that time we only had hope. We 
didn’t know what she would do 
with her life,’” he remembers.
 Newton appreciates his 
daughter and the chance to 
be a part of her career and life. 
“Hillary is a beautiful person, 
inside and out,” he says. “She is 
kind, faithful, fun, talented, hard-
working, and efficient. Watching 
her go through the process of 
taking the bar was excruciating. 
It was the hardest thing ever for 
both of us, but it was worth it. 
Swearing her in to the Indiana 
Bar has truly been the greatest 
honor of my professional career. 
It was a great day for our entire 
family.”
“I believe BYU Law  
excels in preparing  
students to enter  
the workforce and  
be thoughtful, inten-
tional, and hard- 
working attorneys,  
and it goes beyond  
that by encouraging  
pro bono and  
volunteer efforts.” 
—hillary newton kle inhenz
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byu Law hosted the Fifth 
Biennial Emerging Immigration 
Scholars Conference on June 
7–8, 2019. The conference 
provides a forum for emerging 
immigration law scholars to 
receive and provide feedback 
on scholarship, attend panel 
discussions that focus on issues 
relevant to their careers, and 
connect with colleagues from 
across the country. The confer-
ence is especially geared toward 
immigration law professors who 
are pre-tenured. For the keynote, 
Alicia A. Caldwell interviewed 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia about 
current immigration litigation. 
An excerpt of their conversation 
follows.
Caldwell: If I am honest, I hate 
doing this—I hate covering 
immigration right now. But I am 
happy to discuss this topic and 
interview Shoba to the degree 
that I can. She obviously knows 
more than I do. I like to describe 
my understanding of immigra-
tion as peeling an onion, and 
then I find a new onion and 
I peel again, and about four 
layers in, there’s a kumquat. I 
don’t know how the fruit got in 
there, but now it’s a completely 
different animal. Then I have to 
start calling you all so that you 
can help me understand what 
just happened. And litigation is 
one of those topics because it is 
changing, as you all know, on a 
minute-by-minute basis some 
days.
 We’ll start with the travel 
ban. What’s going on?
Wadhia: So as this room is most 
aware, we have a ban. Some 
call it the Muslim ban. We’ve 
had three versions, and the 
third version was operational-
ized on December 4, 2017, well 
before the Supreme Court had 
even made a decision about 
its legality or likely lawful-
ness. On June 26, 2018, Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for a 5 
to 4 Court, found that the ban 
was likely lawful, both under 
the immigration statute and 
under the U.S. Constitution. 
He premised his rationale on 
a couple of things. First, the 
statutory section that was used 
by the administration to enact 
the ban, section 212(f) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
(ina), is something he found to 
be broad and to exude defer-
ence to the president in every 
clause. Second, he also found 
no conflict or clash between this 
broad statute, which gives the 
president authority to suspend 
the entry of any alien or any 
class of aliens, and another 
provision, section 202(a) of 
the ina, which says you cannot 
discriminate on the basis of sex, 
place of birth, nationality, and 
so on when it comes to the issu-
ance of immigrant or permanent 
visas. And the likely constitu-
tionality was upheld because 
a  c o n v e r s a t i o n  
w i t h  a l i c i a  a .  c a l d w e l l  
o f  t h e  w a l l  s t r e e t  
j o u r n a l  a n d  p r o f e s s o r 
s h o b a  s i v a p r a s a d  w a d h i a  
o f  p e n n  s t a t e  l a w
he found in a new rational basis 
test that there was a legitimate 
purpose to the ban.
 What’s happening now is 
really interesting because the 
case was remanded. What that 
means is that lower courts have 
the opportunity to still hear 
challenges to the ban in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Trump v. Hawaii. There are 
right now at least two cases 
that are pending and percolat-
ing through the courts that the 
administration wants thrown 
out in light of Trump v. Hawaii, 
but judges have entertained the 
idea of having the cases move 
forward. One is in the Northern 
District of California and the 
other is in the state of Maryland.
 I think one of the more inter-
esting cases is Emami v. Nielsen. 
It relates to how the waiver 
process is working. Waivers 
are in some viewpoints a sham 
and in other viewpoints a safety 
valve that held the ban together. 
People who are covered by the 
ban can apply for a waiver if 
they can show that denying 
them entry would result in 
undue hardship, that their entry 
is in the national interest, and 
that they are not a danger to the 
national security.
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Caldwell: Let’s talk about the 
asylum ban and the Remain 
in Mexico policy, or Migration 
Protection Protocols (mpp)—
although I do not understand 
them. No one does, if we’re 
being honest. There is currently 
a backlog of 860,000 or 890,000 
cases. Not all are asylum cases, 
but they are immigration cases. 
We know that the vast major-
ity of people, family units in 
particular and unaccompanied 
children, are asking for asy-
lum. Those apprehended at 
the border—and that’s a weird 
way to describe it since most 
people are surrendering—are 
not getting credible fear screen-
ings, by and large. But some are 
now being sent back to Mexico. 
What is happening there in 
terms of both the asylum 
ban litigation and the mpp, or 
Remain in Mexico, litigation? 
They seem tied together but just 
disparate enough.
Wadhia: There is a lot happen-
ing around asylum, and they 
are tied together in the overall 
agenda that this administration 
has with regard to our asylum 
system and our asylum laws. 
I’ll take up the asylum ban 
first because it was rolled out 
earlier, in November 2018. It 
was issued through two tools: 
the first is known as an interim 
final rule, and the second is 
known as the proclamation, 
which is the same tool used in 
the travel ban. The asylum ban 
makes any person who arrives 
at a place other than a port of 
entry or in between a port of 
entry ineligible for asylum. That 
was controversial because it 
very explicitly clashes with our 
immigration statute in section 
208 that says no matter how 
you enter the United States, 
any person may apply for 
asylum.
 Just to get a little nerdy here: 
It’s really hard to talk about 
these policies because they are 
not in the U.S. Constitution; this 
is an interim final rule. So what 
does that mean? For administra-
tive law lovers in the room, that 
simply means that the rule will 
go into effect immediately and 
then the comment period will 
happen afterward. It’s a recur-
ring theme that administrative 
law has really been the hook 
for a lot of the litigation we are 
seeing around these policies. 
The asylum ban was challenged 
front and center on statutory 
grounds in a case called East 
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump. 
Now we have a nationwide 
injunction that has been put into 
place by Judge Jon Tigar in the 
Northern District of California, 
and it’s pending appeal in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
So right now the asylum ban is 
not operational.
 Contrast that with Remain 
in Mexico, which is an even 
harder legal argument to wrap 
your head around. It is largely 
statutory—at least that’s 
what the courts have chosen 
to focus on. You have this 
Byzantine statutory section, 
which is 235(b) of the ina, and 
(b)(1) says there are types of 
people who can be processed 
for speed deportation under 
expedited removal. In which 
case, if they have a “fear,” they 
have to then be transferred 
to an asylum office for a fear 
interview, and if they pass that 
interview, they have to be put 
in full-fledged proceedings.
 But there is another section, 
235(b)(2), that says that any of 
these people, and more, can just 
be placed in regular removal 
proceedings. And this is not only 
allowed under the statute but, 
long before mpp, was allowed 
as a matter of prosecutorial 
discretion. Customs and Border 
Protection (cbp) has always 
had prosecutorial discretion to 
decide to place somebody who 
is legally eligible for expedited 
removal in full-fledged removal 
proceedings, and, in fact, that’s 
something I’ve argued for in my 
work. But here is the “Trumpian 
twist,” a twist that is also in sec-
tion 235(b)(2): the administra-
tion has discretionary authority 
to return people who have 
notices to appear in full removal 
proceedings to Mexico while 
their claim is pending.
 The crux of the legal argu-
ment has been this question: 
If you are legally eligible for 
expedited removal under (b)(1) 
but you are processed under  
(b)(2), can you fall under this 
return provision under (b)(2)?  
The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has agreed enough 
that it stayed an injunc-
tion. This is what makes the 
Remain in Mexico policy alive 
today and makes the statutory 
conversation really confusing. 
It also ignores the other legal 
and policy concerns people 
Alicia Caldwell  
(left) interviews 
Shoba Wadhia  
(right) about
current immigration
litigation. 
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have—including people in this 
room. For example, what about 
international norms and obliga-
tions? What about access to 
counsel? What about condi-
tions in Mexico?
Caldwell: The argument we are 
hearing from the administration 
is that this will stop the flow of 
migrants coming irregularly—
illegally, in their words—and 
crossing the border between 
the ports of entry. And yet the 
numbers keep going up. There 
has been a relative trickle back 
to Mexico, just a few thou-
sand people. That’s going to 
expand. They are going to go 
from San Diego, California, to 
Brownsville, Texas. In theory, 
everybody will be eligible for 
mpp—except for those who are 
not eligible, and it is unclear 
to me who those other people 
are, other than non–Central 
Americans and Mexican nation-
als, and I think that might be 
it. Technically, there are some 
other rules in there, but it 
seems a little bit arbitrary. It 
also is not working.
 Is the rhetoric coming from 
the White House that has been 
used in other litigation something 
that can be used here? In other 
words, the president has essen-
tially said, “This will stop it.  
I’m using this as a punitive effort 
effectively.” He did not use the 
word punitive, but I will, because 
that’s the goal. It is not working. 
About 84,000 people in family 
units crossed the border illegally 
last month, which is a record 
high and eclipses previous sin-
gle-year totals in a 31-day period. 
So something is going on.
Wadhia: Well, there are a few 
things here, right? I guess we 
should question how much 
should rhetoric even be involved 
in what the outcome in litigation 
looks like. We clearly have seen 
some combination and overlap 
in this administration. I think 
we are going to continue to see 
that the goals of mpp, assuming 
they are even legitimate, are 
not being met. We even saw 
that critique coming out of one 
of the judges, who sounded 
like he was dissenting but in 
fact agreed with the stay of the 
injunction.
 I think it will be a failed 
experiment—if in fact the 
administration believes it is 
going to deter people. I have a 
very narrow window into the 
world of the people who are 
coming from Central America 
through Mexico to the border 
and ending up in the Keystone 
State of Pennsylvania, and 
they’re either non-detained or 
they are detained in a family 
detention facility in Berks, a resi-
dential county. A policy like mpp 
is not going to deter any of the 
people I have spoken to or have 
met or consulted with because 
they’re fleeing for their lives. 
Again, without acknowledg-
ing or thinking about the root 
causes for why people are leav-
ing, we’re not going to end up 
with a policy that’s working. But 
we haven’t had an administra-
tion that actually wants to meet 
the people who are affected by 
policy changes.
Caldwell: There’s been lots of 
criticism by the administration 
about nationwide injunctions. A 
single sitting judge can say no 
and thus block the effort nation-
wide. Is that good or bad?
Wadhia: There’s been a lot of 
crankiness around the use of 
nationwide injunctions. I have a 
few thoughts. First, I fall in the 
camp that our immigration law 
is federal. If we’re in the midst 
of litigation being the rapid 
response to policies—because 
we do live in a world of checks 
and balances—we should have 
a uniform application. I’m okay 
with a nationwide injunction 
treating a policy similarly for 
the sake of uniformity. I also 
think it adheres with some of 
the administrative law values 
I support, like consistency 
and uniformity. I also think 
it’s a little inaccurate to say 
that a single judge makes a 
decision because we’ve had 
a lot of policies that we just 
discussed in this hour where 
there have been multiple courts 
and judges issuing nationwide 
injunctions, so it’s not neces-
sarily by a single judge. Finally, I 
would say that I don’t think the 
long-term solution is nation-
wide injunctions. I think those 
are necessary for responding to 
policy changes that violate our 
law, but ultimately, we’re going 
to need a legislative solution.
 This all makes for a great 
way to teach civics, like when 
my grandmother was studying 
for her citizenship test. You can 
sit down with your grandmother 
or kid and really do a close 
study of the three branches of 
government: where the execu-
tive is coming in with a policy, 
where courts are coming in 
to protect checks and bal-
ances and prevent overreach, 
and where Congress is trying 
to respond with either the 
American Dream and Promise 
Act or the No Ban Act to really 
respond to what is needed in 
the long-term legislatively.
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, a 
professor at Penn State Law, is 
an expert on immigration law 
whose research focuses on the 
role of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration law and the intersec-
tions of race, national security, and 
immigration. She has published 
more than 30 law review articles, 
book chapters, and essays on 
immigration law.
Alicia A. Caldwell covers 
immigration for the Wall Street 
Journal, focusing on everything 
from border security to the 
impacts of immigration in the 
United States. She came to the 
Wall Street Journal from the 
Associated Press in August 2017 
and has reported on immigration 
since 2005 from both El Paso, 
Texas, and Washington, DC.
“I like to describe my  
understanding of  
immigration as peeling  
an onion, and then I  
find a new onion  
and I peel again, and  
about four layers  
in, there’s a kumquat.” 
—al i c i a  c a l dwe l l
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